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Toward True and Plain Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent
Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital
BRUCE A. MARKELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent transfer law' is in the midst of a renewal and a revival.
Ten years ago Congress rewrote the Bankruptcy Code section related to
*B.A., Pitzer College, 1977; J.D., University of California, Davis, 1980. The author
is a member of the California bar and is a partner with the Los Angeles office of Sidley
& Austin. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Sidley & Austin or any of its clients.
'There are at least five sources of fraudulent transfer law. The basic text for the
last seventy years has been the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), promulgated
in 1918 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (National
Conference). The UFCA is reprinted at 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985). The National Conference
promulgated a new uniform act in 1984, calling it the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(UFTA). It is reprinted at 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). The third source is section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Code). The Code is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1982). The
fourth source, relevant primarily in the interpretation of older cases, is section 67d of the
now-repealed Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act). Like the Code, the Act contained its own sec-
tion covering fraudulent transfers, which, for the most part, mirrored the UFCA. Act
§ 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1976) (repealed 1979). See infra note 103. Finally, fraudulent
conveyance law was part of the common law received from England, and almost every
state either adopted it through decisional law, or codified its own version by statute. See,
e.g., Molitor v. Molitor, 184 Conn. 530, 535, 440 A.2d 215, 218 (1981) (finding that the
UFCA "is largely an adoption and clarification of the standards of the common law");
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (Vernon 1968) (repealed 1987).
An excellent and detailed account of the common law history of fraudulent conveyances
can be found in I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 58-62b
(Rev. ed. 1940). An equally excellent analytical account of the policy goals served by
fraudulent transfer law can be found in Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to
Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REV. 505 (1977).
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such transfers, 2 and four years ago the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a new uniform act for
state adoption.' During this period, both state and federal courts have
invalidated, in the name of such fraudulent transfer laws, a broad range
of transactions, including mortgage foreclosures 4 and leveraged buyouts.'
These cases have been controversial; 6 indeed, many have been the animus
for new legislation. 7
The focus of this concern has been "constructively" fraudulent
transfers. This branch of fraudulent transfer law scrutinizes transactions
in which a person transfers property or incurs an obligation' without
211 U.S.C. § 548 (1982), adopted as part of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). The Code's effective date was October 1, 1979. Id.
§ 402.
3Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, supra note 1.
4See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
Durrett unleashed a mammoth amount of academic writing and case law. A partial collection
can be found in McCoid, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate
Consideration, 62 TEXAs L. REV. 639, 639 nn.l-8 (1983).
'See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D.
Pa. 1983), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 3229
(1987); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 17 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
911 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (allowing fraudulent conveyance attack on $140,000,000 leveraged
buyout to proceed). See generally Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987); see also infra note 152.
6With respect to mortgage foreclosures, see Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property
Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem,
38 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1613 n.22 (1983); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers
According to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW. 977,
979 (1984). With respect to leveraged buyouts, see Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank
and Trust Co. of Chicago, 77 Bankr. 754, 759-60 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (questioning applicability
of fraudulent transfer laws to leveraged buyouts), aff'd sub. nom. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845
F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 850-54 (1985).
7The foment caused by Durrett and the various legislative reactions are reviewed
in Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 U.C.C.L.J. 195, 206-08 (1986).
See also 130 CONo. REc. S7617 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (amendment effectively overruling
Durrett, deleted due to lack of ability to debate merits); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.08(e)(2)
(West Supp. 1988) (transfer not voidable if it results from "[enforcement of lien in a non-
collusive manner and in compliance with applicable law .... "); Comment (5) to Proposed
Section 3439.08 of the CA. Civ. CODE, Report of Assembly Comm. on Fin. and Ins. on
S.B. 2150, reprinted in CA. ASEMBLY J. 8569, 8568 (July 8, 1986) [hereinafter CA. ASSEmaLY
J.] (explicitly rejecting Durrett).
'The original target of fraudulent conveyance laws was transfers of tangible property
to avoid execution, levy and seizure by the transferor's creditors. See G. GLENN, supra
note 1; Baird & Jackson, supra note 6. The common law later came to the view that a
creditor's incurrence of certain obligations could also offend, in that they would force a
debtor's legitimate creditors to share distributions with individuals whose claims might be
suspect. Accordingly, the UFCA enabled creditors to set aside not only conveyances, but
also obligations, if they were not exchanged for a fair consideration and made while the
transferor or obligor was in a condition of financial stringency. UFCA §§ 3, 4 & 6.
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receiving a corresponding and reasonably equivalent benefit, such as in
gifts9 or accommodation guaranties.'0 If the transferor is also left in a
specified and defined condition of financial stringency, a "constructively"
fraudulent transfer exists.
Creditors of the transferor can, among other things, seek to set
aside the "constructively" fraudulent transfer, without regard to the
state of mind or intent of the parties." In short, the "fraudulent"
transfer need not be made with any intent to defraud; indeed, it can
even have been made with the purest of motives. Nevertheless, as long
as it depletes the transferor's assets and leaves the transferor with what
the law deems insufficient remaining assets, the transfer may be set
aside.
Constructively fraudulent transfers exist if two conditions are present.
The first is the transferor's failure to receive fair consideration or
Section 5 of the UFCA, supra note 1, which covers conveyances which leave the
transferor with unreasonably small capital, however, only extends to conveyances. Obli-
gations are not within its scope. UFCA § 5. The Code and the UFTA, have eliminated
this distinction. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982); UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(b)(i).
'See Hyman v. Porter (In re Porter), 37 Bankr. 56 (E.D. Va. 1984); Reade v.
Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. Ch. 1818).
'°Although the issue was "left to case law" under the Code, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., Part 11, at 177 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], current cases
have found accommodation guaranties to be lacking in reasonably equivalent value as
required by section 548(a)(2)(A). Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978
(lst Cir. 1983); Whitlock v. Max Goodman & Sons Realty, Inc. (In re Goodman Indus.,
Inc.), 21 Bankr. 512 (D. Mass. 1982). See also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Oppenheim,
109 Misc. 2d 649, 440 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (applying New York version
of UFCA). But cf In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1988) (sug-
gesting that affiliate may derivatively obtain sufficient value from intercorporate guaranty).
"Under the UFCA, a creditor holding a "matured" claim has the following options
with respect to remedies: it can seek to set aside, to the extent necessary to satisfy
the creditor's claim, the transaction deemed fraudulent, or it may ignore the conveyance
and seek to levy upon the property in the hands of the transferee. UFCA, supra note
1, § 9. By contrast, holders of "unmatured" claims may also seek to set aside the claim,
but may not levy execution. Instead, they are given equitable remedies to enjoin further
disposition of the property fraudulently conveyed. Id. § 10. One major advance of the
UFCA over the common law was that it eliminated the necessity for a creditor to reduce
its claim to judgment, or to have its execution returned unsatisfied, as a predicate for
maintaining an action. See also American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E.
783 (1929).
Remedies under the UFTA are similar, except that the UFTA eliminates distinctions
between matured and unmatured claims. UFTA, supra note 1, § 7. In addition, the UFTA
offers an option of adding the provisional remedy of attachment. See Prefatory Note to
UFTA, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
The Code allows the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession to "avoid" the
transfer. II U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982). This, in turn, permits the entity avoiding the transfer
to "recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property .... ." I U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982).
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reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or the obli-
gation. 2 The second is the presence of a predefined adverse financial
condition, either before the questioned transaction or because of it;" in
short, the law requires debtors to be just before they are generous. 4 In
this regard, the classic type of precarious financial condition has been
balance sheet insolvency, and most constructively fraudulent transfer
cases explore this concept."
The common law and its statutory codifications, however, recognize
at least one other adverse financial condition. Under all forms of fraud-
ulent transfer laws, a voluntary transfer or one for inadequate consid-
eration will be set aside if it leaves the transferor with "unreasonably
small capital.' 6 Although not the subject of a vast body of case law, 7
the origins of this type of fraudulent transfer run deep, and the recent
legislative reformations may have increased its potential as a creditor's
remedy.
This article reviews the origins of the unreasonably small capital
branch of fraudulent transfer law. It then traces its development and
its various formulations under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA) and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act). After reviewing recent
cases and the changes made by the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (Code)
and the new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), it then criticizes
two lines of cases which are contrary to the action's historical antecedents
and the goals of modern fraudulent transfer law. It concludes by sug-
gesting unifying themes linking the historical origins of the action with
current case law.
"II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982); UFCA, supra note 1, §§ 4-6; UFTA, supra note 1,
§ 4(a)(l).
"These conditions are: insolvency, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i); UFCA, supra note
1, § 4; UFTA, supra note 1, § 5; a knowing incurrence by the transferor of debts beyond
the transferor's ability to repay them, I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii); UFCA, supra note
1, § 6; UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(a)(2)(ii); and the topic of this article, unreasonably small
capital or assets, I I U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii); UFCA, supra note 1, § 5; UFTA, supra
note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i).
"See Claflin v. Mess, 30 N.J. Eq. 211, 212, (1878); Black v. Sanders, 46 N.C. (1
Jones) 67, 68 (1854).
"The Uniform Laws Annotated requires 29 pages to list the annotations for con-
structively fraudulent transfers involving insolvency. 7A U.L.A. 479-504, nn.9-91 (1985)
& 78-9, nn.10-91 (Supp. 1988).
"The UFTA changes this formulation to "unreasonably small assets." UFTA, supra
note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i). The change was meant to "focus attention on whether the amount
of all the assets retained by the debtor was inadequate, i.e., unreasonably small, in light
of the needs of the business or transaction in which the debtor was engaged or about
to engage." UFTA, supra note 1, § 4, comment 4.
"While the casenote annotations for the insolvency section of the UFCA cover 29
pages, see supra note 15, the annotations for the unreasonably small capital section take
up barely five pages. 7A U.L.A. 504-507 (1985) & 80 (Supp. 1988).
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LAWS
A. Common Law Origins
American fraudulent transfer laws date from the Statute of Elizabeth,
enacted in 1571.11 Designed as a penal statute, with the English crown
receiving as its penalty fully one-half of all property recovered, 9 it
prohibited conveyances made with the "intent to delay, hinder or defraud
creditors and others of their just and lawful actions. '20 The statute saw
such conveyances as contributing to "the overthrow of all true and plain
dealing . . . without which no commonwealth or civil society can be
maintained or continued." 21
Defrauded creditors soon turned this penal statute to their personal
ends. Since such transfers were illegal, and thus presumable void, creditors
reasoned that they could ignore the conveyance and follow the transferred
property into the hands of the party receiving the goods.2 2 In short,
passage of title was ignored, and the parti receiving the goods had to
give them up if the debt was just.23 Courts adopted this reasoning, 24
and in 1603 Parliament followed suit and made fraudulent conveyances
a part of the English bankruptcy laws.25 In 1623 Parliament completed
the process and made these laws civil in nature. 26
The exact language of the statute, however, seemed to require proof
of "actual" fraudulent intent. Yet one who fraudulently transfers prop-
'113 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571), repealed by The Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 20,
§ 172 (1925).
Roman law had recognized as a nominate tort an action fraus creditiorum similar
in purpose and effect to the Statute of Elizabeth. See I G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 60;
Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1-2, nn.l-2 (1938); Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman
Law, 18 VA. L. REV, 109 (1931).
19Parties who knowingly participated in the conveyance "incurrled] the penalty and
forfeiture of one years value of the said lands . . . and the whole value of the said goods
.... .13 Eliz., ch. 5, § 2 (1571). Of this amount, "one moitie whereof"-that is, one-
half-went to the crown and the other half went to the "party or parties aggrieved."
Id. A prison term of one half year "without bail" was also provided. Id. See also I G.
GLENN, supra note 1, § 61a.
2013 Eliz., ch. 5, § 1 (1571).
21Id.
I2 Mannocke's Case, 3 Dyer 204b, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (Q.B. 1571). The famous decision
in Tywne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 Star. Ch. (1601) did not involve a
private action. Rather, it was the crown's action to receive its one-half share of the goods
transferred.
2 Bethel v. Stanhope, 78 Eng. Rep. 1037, 1038 (Q.B. 1599).
2 2 d.
2"1 Jac. 1, c. 15 (1603).
2621 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 7 (1623).
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erty can hardly be expected to step up and admit it. Common law
lawyers and judges thus develop&: bridges from questionable acts com-
monly associated with fraud to findings of actual fraudulent intent.
Called "badges of fraud, ' 27 these indicia of transactions imbued with
fraud developed into a sort of common law shopping list for those
seeking to levy on property thought to be properly part of a debtor's
estate.2 8 The list's length is testimony to the ingenuity of a debtor who
perceives that it is trapped by its creditors. 29
Several items merited special attention. Transfers for little or no
consideration-termed "voluntary conveyances"- were especially sus-
pect,30 since they drained the pool of assets available for creditors without
replenishing the source.3 Yet, if carried to its logical conclusion, setting
aside all gratuitous transfers would void most gifts and other transfers
otherwise deemed socially acceptable.12
As a consequence, British common law arrived at the view that
creditors could not attack voluntary transfers so long as the transferor
2
'A "badge of fraud" has been defined to be a fact which is calculated to throw
suspicion upon a transaction, and calling for an explanation. Peebles v. Horton, 64 N.C.
374, 377 (1870); M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES Ch. XVII, at 515
n.2 (Knowlton, ed. 1911). See also Boston Trading Group, Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d
1504, 1509 (1st Cir. 1987) (badges of fraud described as "a set of objective criteria ...
use[d] as a basis for inferring fraudulent intent.").
28The basic list is published together with Lord Coke's reporting of Tywne's Case.
See Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601).
2 The UFTA lists eleven such badges of fraud, from the status of the transferee as
an insider to the transfer of essential assets to a lienor who then transfers them to an
insider of the debtor. UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(b)(l)-(l1).
At least one authority existing at the time the UFCA was promulgated divided badges
of fraud into major and minor categories. M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, at Ch. XVII.
3 Originally, English common law invalidated all gratuitous transfers. Tywne's Case,
76 Eng. Rep. at 810, note b. See also W. ROBERTS, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE STATUTES 13 ELIZ. C. 5, AND 27 ELIZ. C. 4 RELATING TO VOLUNTARY AND FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES § IV (3d Am. ed. 1845). That view no longer prevails. See infra note 33.
"As Professor McCoid has noted, there is a difference between "voluntary" con-
veyances, which were the aim of most early cases, and transfers for inadequate consideration,
which are the subject of most modern fraudulent transfer cases. McCoid, supra note 4.
See also M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, at 519; 0. Bump, A TREATISE UPON CONVEYANCES
MADE BY DEBTORS TO DEFRAUD CREDITORS §§ 57, 247 (J. Gray rev. 4th ed. 1896).
Nevertheless, modern fraudulent transfer law makes no substantive distinction between
the two which, as Professor McCoid notes, probably accounts for confusions such as
Durrett has caused. McCoid, supra note 4.
"Early case law in America adopted this strict position. The most famous of these
cases was Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. 1818). Although Reade was not
universally followed, see Howard v. Williams, 1 Bail. 575, 583 (S.C. 1830) (limiting Reade
to its particular facts), its holding was sufficiently widespread to be a major cause of
concern to the drafters of the UFCA. Prefatory Note to UFCA, 7A U.L.A. 427, 428
(1985).
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was solvent after the transfer.33 Solvency, in turn, was defined as the
financial state of possessing more assets than liabilities.3 4 From the
common law lawyer's point of view, this made sense: as long as there
were sufficient assets to satisfy all creditors claims, the gift should be
valid."
1. Two Problems: Subsequent Creditors and Marginal Solvency.-
Stating the principle, however, proved easier than its application. At
least two separate questions arose regarding the application and the scope
of "insolvency:" The first was a question of standing: if a transferor
was still solvent after the transfer, were there conditions under which
subsequent creditors could use this badge of fraud to attack the transfer?
The second question was closely related: if a debtor intentionally trans-
ferred just enough property to sympathetic third parties to remain mar-
ginally solvent, what recourse did its present creditors have under the
fraudulent conveyance laws?
The ultimate3 6 answer to the first question was short and predictable:
courts tested such transfers as if they were varieties of transfers made
with the actual "intent to hinder, delay or defraud. 3 7 Phrased in this
manner, subsequent creditors could attack the transfer only if they bore
the burden of proof of the original fraudulent intent.38 In short, creditors
"See, e.g., Shears v. Rodgers, 110 Eng. Rep. 137, 139 (K.B. 1832); Jackson v.
Bowley, 174 Eng. Rep. 426, 429 (Nisi Prius 1841).
'See, e.g., H. MAY, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES 30
(W. Edwards 3d ed. 1908) (insolvency exists "if the property left after the conveyance
is not enough to pay [the transferor's] debts"); Jackson v. Bowley, 174 Eng. Rep. 426,
429 (Nisi Prius 1841) ("if the property left after the conveyance is not enough to pay
[the transferor's] debts, that is insolvency sufficient for the purposes of the plaintiff in
this action.").
"As Professor McCoid has noted, however, most early courts dealt with cases with
no consideration-so called "voluntary conveyances"-as opposed to conveyances for
inadequate consideration. McCoid, supra note 4. Indeed, some early commentators treated
transfers for no consideration and transfers for little consideration quite differently. See
M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, Ch. XVII, at 519; 0. BUMp, supra note 31, §§ 57, 247.
36The initial answer was neither clear nor uniform. As stated by Chief Justice Marshall:
"With respect to subsequent creditors, the application of [the Statute of Elizabeth] appears
to have admitted 'of some doubt." Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 229, 243
(1823). See also Williams v. Banks, 11 Md. 198 (1857) (split decision over issue).
"Williams v. Banks, 11 Md. 198, 250 (1857); See also Stratton v. Edwards, 174
Mass. 374, 378, 54 N.E. 886, 887 (1899) (proof must be of an actual intent to harm a
particular creditor; general purpose of securing against hazard of future business per-
missible); Monroe v. Smith, 79 Pa. 459, 461 (1876); Ex Parte Russell, 19 Ch. D. 588,
591, 46 L.T.R. (n.s.) 113, 115 (C.A. 1882).
"Elwell v. Walker, 52 Iowa 256, 263, 3 N.W. 64, 70 (1879); Claflin v. Mess, 30
N.J. Eq. 211, 212 (1878). Even if transfer was a matter of public record, however, proof
of actual misrepresentation as to ownership of transferred assets could shift the burden
of proving a lack of fraudulent intent back to the transferor. Fisher v. Lewis, 69 Mo.
629, 632-33 (1879).
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had to show that the transfer was "for the purpose" of hindering,
delaying or defrauding future creditors.3 9
This required creditors to connect the transfer's consequences with
the transferor's actual intent. 40 Factual circumstances often helped. In
Case v. Phelps,4' for example, Phelps had transferred all his assets in
trust for his own and his family's benefit; he then immediately started,
with no personal capital, a "traveling Indian show." '42 The New York
Court of Appeals had little problem in finding that this situation evinced
an "intent to defraud creditors whom he [Phelps] expected to owe, and
whom possible losses might render him unable to pay . . . . This is
fraud in fact . . . 43
Lumping subsequent creditors with all other victims of transfers
designed to defraud had other effects. One was that subsequent creditors
sought to use badges of fraud from other strands of fraudulent con-
veyance law in addition to insolvency to fit their situation. One badge
of fraud that seemed to attract creditors consisted of a transfer in which
the transferor engaged in business knowingly left himself just marginally
solvent, and still continued in business.
The rise of this new badge of fraud grew from the perceived
underinclusiveness of simple insolvency. When testing insolvency, all that
was required was the valuation of assets and liabilities; the result flowed
from the numerical difference between the two. But debtors as well as
creditors can add and subtract, and debtors often made voluntary transfers
which left themselves solvent, but just barely so." Courts found such fact
39E.g., Mowry v. Reed, 187 Mass. 174, 177, 72 N.E. 936, 937 (1905); Stratton v.
Edwards, 174 Mass. 374, 378, 54 N.E. 886, 887 (1899); Winchester v. Charter, 94 Mass.
(12 Allen) 606, 610-11 (1866); Case v. Phelps, 39 N.Y. 164, 169 (1868).
'To make matters more difficult, at least one commentator believed that such proof
had to be by "clear, full and satisfactory" evidence. 0. BuMP, supra note 31, § 256, at
296.
439 N.Y. 164 (1868).
"1d. at 165.
41d. at 170.
4Bohn v. Weeks, 50 Ill. App. 236, 240 (1893) (invalidating gift of $6500, when
assets were $7200 to $7300, and when transferor had outstanding and overdue a $400
note); Williams v. Huges, 136 N.C. 58, 59, 48 S.E. 518, 519 (1904) (finding, as a
matter of law, that assets of $11,625 were "not fully sufficient and available for the
satisfaction of the Itransferor's] creditors" when liabilities equaled $11,500); Black v.
Sanders, 46 N.C. (I Jones) 67, 69 (1854) (finding that retention of $7250 in assets to
cover $6848 of liabilities was insufficient, basing holding on poor quality of the assets;
"[no man would lend money upon such security"); Crumbaugh v. Kugler, 2 Ohio St.
374, 379 (1854) (retention of $48,000 of property insufficient when outstanding debts
approximated $42,000; insufficiency "owing to expenses incident to sale, and the sacrifice
almost universally affecting forced sales . . . "); Monroe v. Smith, 79 Pa. 459, 461 (1875);
Hunters v. Waite, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 25, 47 (1846); Ex Parte Russell, 19 Ch. D. 588, 591,
46 L.T.R. (n.s.) 113, 115 (C.A. 1882) (finding that solvency cannot be based upon the
value of "some odds and ends which can possibly be sold, and on which he puts his
fancy value.").
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patterns to be badges of fraud-and hence permissible bridges to actual
intent to defraud-if such transfers unfairly shifted the risk of liquidating
assets into cash onto creditors." In addition, some courts found similar
unfairness if solvency after the transfer depended upon volatile or tran-
sitory factors, such as the "stability of the market." '46
This risk shifting was seen as a species of fraud; the transferor's
ability to convert his assets into cash was diminished, yet trade continued
without notice of this change, usually to the detriment of a creditor
who had relied on a prior course of dealing .4  This was seen as wrong;
as noted by Orlando Bump, an early commentator, creditors "have the
right to expect satisfaction of their debts out of [the transferor's] property,
and [the transferor] has no right, in law or morals, to throw upon them
the loss which must necessarily occur in converting it into money.' '48
As a result of this reasoning, several rationales for this badge of
fraud developed. It was, for example, a badge of fraud to be barely
solvent after making a transfer: if one was left with assets unsuitable
for lending; 49 if the resulting solvency depended to a great degree on
the stability of the market;5 0 or if one did not provide for reasonably
anticipated5' or overdue debts.12 As with the problem of standing for
subsequent creditors, these responses had an ad hoc flavor. Each case
45See, e.g., Schreyer v. Scott, 134 U.S. 405, 410 (1890) (stating that it was improper
to knowingly "throw the hazards of business in which [the transferor] is about to engage
upon others, instead of honestly holding his means subject to the chance of those adverse
results to which all business enterprises are liable .... "); Mackay v. Douglas, 14 L.R.-
Eq. 106, 121, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 721, 723 (Ch. 1872) (in which the thought process of someone
who transfers assets in trust prior to going into a new business was characterized
as follows: " 'I am going into trade; I believe I may make a great deal of money by it,
but nobody knows what may happen, therefore I will make myself safe. I will make this
large fortune safe by settling it on my wife and children absolutely.' "); 0. BUMP, supra
note 31, § 258, at 297.
46Carpenter v. Roe, 10 N.Y. 227, 231 (1851) (solvency cannot depend "on the
intelligence to be brought by the next steamer"); Brown v. Case, 41 Ore. 221, 229, 69
Pac. 43, 46 (1902) (solvency cannot be "contingent on stability of the market."). See
also Izard v. Izard, I Bail. Eq. 228, 236-37 (S.C. 1831) ("The fluctuations in the value
of property, occasioned by the mercantile condition of the country, cannot however be
ranked among [those] casualties [for which the transferor need not provide].").
"'See 1 D. MOORE, A TREATISE ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND CREDITORS'
REMEDIES AT LAW AND EQUITY § 8, at 277 (1908).
410. BUMp, supra note 31, § 258, at 297.
4gE.g., Black v. Sanders, 46 N.C. (I Jones) 67, 69 (1854); see also supra note 46.
Cf. Babcock v. Eckler, 24 N.Y. 623 (1862) (when property retained approximated $10,000,
and debts then equalled $900, transfer upheld).
'
0See note 46 supra. See also D. MOORE, supra note 47.
'See D. MOORE, supra note 47.
'"E.g., Bohn v. Weeks, 50 Ill. App. 236, 240 (1893).
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stood on its own facts, with easily stated, but loose and amorphous
rules as general guides for decision.
2. A Synthesis: The New Business Doctrine Augments Insolvency.-
Decisions such as Case v. Phelps53 galvanized early American judicial
thinking, and helped to form a synthesis between the standing and
marginal solvency cases. The transfer of all of a person's assets in trust
for the benefit of his family, in order to begin a "traveling Indian
show ' 5 4 did not sit well. Courts saw such opportunism as an impediment
to business generally, and a species of fraud perpetrated upon reasonably
anticipated future creditors." But at some point such opportunism melds
with the prudence of financial planning; courts grappled with conditions
under which they would find the requisite impermissible intent. In this
struggle, subsequent creditor cases which used strict standing rules were
compared with the marginal solvency cases, which seemed to provide
an analytical basis for the relaxation of the standing limitations. Given
the similarity of the set of injured creditors under both rules, cases
began to conflate standing rules, and drop the requirement of actual
intent.5 6
This blending of rationales initially produced inconsistent results. In
both Hagerman v. Buchanan57 and Mackay v. Douglas,5" for example,
transferors had conveyed their property in trust prior to entering into
a trading partnership. In both cases, the partnership failed, and creditors
whose debts arose after the conveyance sought to set it aside. Hagerman
allowed the transfer to stand; Mackay invalidated it.
Hagerman considered "[tihe character of the business, the degree
of pecuniary hazard incurred, the amount of property remaining in the
grantor, the value of the property conveyed, [and] the acts and words
occurring coincidentally with the transaction." ' 9 The court gave great
weight to the transferor's belief that the partnership, although risky,
was "entirely safe." 6 It thus allowed the transferor's testimony to
overcome the "strong evidence of fraudulent intent" which arises when
"a person has entered into a hazardous business, or engaged in a
speculative enterprise, at or soon after the execution of a voluntary
conveyance."
6
'
5339 N.Y. 164 (1868).
"Id. at 165.
"Id.
56E.g., Edwards v. Entwisle, 13 D.C. (2 Mackay) 43, 55-56 (1882) (insolvent debtor's
intent to defraud existingcreditors is prima facie evidence of intent to defraud subsequent
creditors); see cases cited infra note 74; 0. BUMP, supra note 31, § 295.
5145 N.J. Eq. 292, 17 A. 946 (1889).
1114 L.R.-Eq. 106, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 721 (Ch. 1872).
945 N.J. Eq. at 302, 17 A. at 948.
"'Id.
6id.
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In Mackay, a managing clerk had been admitted to a jute trading
partnership. 62 Immediately prior to his admission, however, he had trans-
ferred a valuable leasehold in trust for his wife. 63 Seven months after
his admission, the partnership became "embarrassed," and declared
bankruptcy four months thereafter. 64 The vice chancellor agreed that the
circumstances justified suspicion; he ruled, however, that the transferor
bore "the burden of proving ... that [he was] in a position to make
the voluntary settlement. ' '65
The transferor attempted to meet this burden with evidence of his
good faith and reasonable belief in the success of the venture, 66 which
presumably would have sufficed under Hagerman. The English court
parted ways with Hagerman's rationale, however, and held that a justified
belief in success was insufficient to sustain the transfer. 67 The court
stated that "the motive therefore in executing this settlement was to
protect this property against his creditors, if creditors he should have;
in other words, to take the bulk of his property out of the reach of
his creditors if any disaster should befall him." ' 68 The court then found
that "a man who contemplates going into trade, cannot, on the eve of
doing so, take the bulk of his property out of the reach of those who
may become his creditors in his trading operations. ' 69 As a consequence,
the court invalidated the transfer. 70
Cases such as Hagerman and Mackay highlighted the uncertain fate
of subsequent creditors. Different results could be, and were, obtained
depending on the deference given by the deciding tribunal to one's
obligations to pay contemplated debts. Courts following Mackay required
full provision; courts following Hagerman and its progeny seemed to
allow more leeway for the well meaning, but improvident, transferor.
The confusion caused by the lack of clear guidelines further obscured
the main goal of such cases: augmentation of the under-inclusiveness
of the concept of solvency as an independent badge of fraud. The evil
to be avoided was not the preservation, at any one point in time, of
sufficient assets to pay existing creditors; rather, the goal was to prevent
the unjust failure of the normal commercial expectation that business
6214 L.R.-Eq. 106, 108, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 721, 721.
631d.
Id. at 109, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 721.
"Id. at 119, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 722.
-Id. at 114, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 721.
671d. at 121, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 723.
"Id. at 122, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 723.
691d. at 122, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) at 724.
701d.
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debt will be paid in a timely manner. 7' Indeed, fraudulent or questionable
actions can be taken long before claims ripen or mature, 72 and the
solvency concept does not address these at all.
As noted above, 73 the failure of the insolvency badge of fraud to
address fully these legitimate questions caused tension. Courts observed
that the risk allocation present in transfers leaving the transferor barely
solvent was similar to the risk allocation involved in insulating assets
from the claims of subsequent creditors. 74 Both types of transfers "rob"
the pool of assets-both present and future-from which trade creditors
customarily expect their claims to be satisfied.
Cases involving transfers of assets prior to the start of a new business
formed the crucible for a new rule, or, in the argot of nineteenth century
fraudulent conveyance law, a new badge of fraud. These new business
cases, exemplified by Hagerman and Mackay, contained examples of
both types of problems with insolvency as a sufficient badge of fraud.
Subsequent creditors were a certainty, and often transferors explicitly
sought to insulate their assets from the risks associated with new business.75
As a consequence of the similarity of rationale, cases tended to drop
1'Id. at 286 ("The true rule by which the fraudulency or fairness of a voluntary
conveyance is to be ascertained ... is .. .the pecuniary ability of the donor at the time
to withdraw the amount of the donation from his estate without the least hazard to his
creditors, or in any material degree lessening their then prospects of payment."). See also
Clark, supra note 1, at 544 (the "flexible concept of unreasonably small capital, which
relates to insolvency in its pragmatic meaning ... guaranties that mechanical balance
sheet tests of insolvency, which can be arbitrary and misleading, do not vitiate the ideal.");
Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary
Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 433, 454 (1980) (noting that "determinations [of
unreasonably small capital and inability to pay debts as they become due] merely complement
the central concept of insolvency by assuring that creditors do not lose their protection
by reason of the momentary solvency of [a party] at the time of the transaction.")
"See, e.g., NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (Comm. Print 1936) ("[Elxperience has demonstrated that a dishonest
debtor usually begins his fraudulent activities at a time long prior to four months before
his bankruptcy .... ).
"See supra text accompanying notes 57-70.
"Cf. Bohn v. Weeks, 50 I11. App. 236, 239-40 (1893) (combining discussion of transfers
made by insolvents with gifts made under reasonable circumstances when stating rationale
for rule); Brown v. Case, 41 Ore. 221, 229, 69 Pac. 43, 46 (1902) (discussing approxima-
tions of financial ability to pay creditors after transfer for both insolvents and those on
the brink of insolvency).
Indeed, if the identity of trade creditors, and the relative amounts of their respective
debts, are the same both before and after the questioned transfer, the risk allocation is
virtually identical.
"E.g. Case v. Phelps, 39 N.Y. 164 (1868); Hagerman v. Buchanan, 45 N.J. Eq.
292, 17 A. 896 (1889); Mackay v. Douglas, 14 L.R.-Eq. 106, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 721 (Ch.
1872).
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the strict rule that the creditor/plaintiff had to prove actual intent to
defraud, and allowed subsequent creditors standing to attack such trans-
fers.7 6
These cases categorized the rule differently. Some stated that the
transferor was impermissibly "throw[ing] the hazards of business in
which he is about to engage upon others." '7 Others phrased the trans-
feror's act as "cast[ing] upon his creditors the hazard of his specula-
tion."' 78 However stated, when courts relaxed standing rules and permitted
certain acts to imply fraud, a frustrated creditor only had to show a
voluntary transfer, the nature of the transferor's business and a lack
of a reasonable reserve against foreseeable risks79 of that new business.8 0
Once the creditor made this showing, it became the debtor's burden of
dispelling the presumption of fraud that such facts tended to establish. 8
"E.g., Edwards v. Entwisle, 13 D.C. (2 Mackay) 43, 55-56 (1882) (insolvent debtor's
intent to defraud existing creditors is prima facie evidence of intent to defraud subsequent
creditors); see cases cited supra note 74; 0. BUMP, supra note 31, § 295.
77Schreyer v. Scott, 134 U.S. 405, 410 (1890).
7Carpenter v. Roe, 10 N.Y. 227, 232 (1851).
19The concept of risk was often expressed as a "hazard" to be avoided. See supra
notes 77-78. This concept was sometimes applied not to the general risks of businesses,
but to the nature of the business itself. Indeed, the first draft of the UFCA applied only
to a transferor in a "hazardous" business; this was deleted from the second draft. See
infra text accompanying notes 87-93. Collier indicates that the omission of the qualifying
adjective "hazardous" in the final draft "can be construed only as conscious and de-
liberate." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 548.04, at 548-55 to 548-56 n.10 (15th ed. 1988),
and thus strongly indicative of a broad application of section 5.
Notwithstanding this change, some early section 5 cases continued to base their
holdings on findings that the transferor was involved in a hazardous or speculative business.
See, e.g., State v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 388, 190 S.W.2d 785 (1944), cert.
denied, 181 Tenn. 74 (1945); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh, 313
Pa. 467, 169 A. 209 (1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 680 (1934); People Sav. & Dime Bank
& Trust Co. v. Scott, 303 Pa. 294, 154 A. 489 (1931). The current view, however,
is that even traditional businesses can run afoul of this section. Compare Fidelity Trust
Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 169 A. 209 (1933), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 680 (1934) (speculative nature of trading stocks considered) with Teitelbaum v.
Voss (In re Tuller's, Inc.), 480 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1973) (business involved was simple
drugstore) and Zuk v. Hale, 114 N.H. 813, 330 A.2d 448 (1974) (business was that of
independent general contractor). See also M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, Ch. VIII, § 3, at
237.
"°E.g., Gable v. Columbus Cigar Co., 140 Ind. 563, 567, 38 N.E. 474, 475 (1894);
Fisher v. Lewis, 69 Mo. 629, 632 (1879). See also M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, Ch. VII,
§ 3, at 230-31; 0. BUMP, supra note 31, § 258; 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 335.
"See Elwell v. Walker, 52 Iowa 256, 263, 3 N.W. 64, 70 (1879); State v. Nashville
Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 388, 419, 190 S.W.2d 785, 796-97 (1944), cert. denied, 181
Tenn. 74 (1945); Mackay v. Douglas, 14 L.R.-Eq. 106, 113, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 721, 722
(Ch. 1872); H. MAY, supra note 34, at 30-31.
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Such views, however, were hardly uniform, and the dissonance in these
decisions led to a movement to unify and harmonize these disparate
themes.8 2
B. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
Differences over standing rules and the interpretation of insolvency
were by no means the only non-uniform interpretations of the Statute
of Elizabeth. Because the prevailing analysis used various factors and
badges of fraud, each having a different weight-both among themselves
and in different cases-non-uniform results were the norm. 3 Conse-
quently, one of the first uniform acts suggested by the National Con-
ference was the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), s4 proposed
in 1916, but not adopted until 1918.
This act, ultimately adopted in 25 states,5 preserved the traditional
ability to set aside transactions entered into with actual intent to "hinder,
delay or defraud" creditors. But it went beyond the original language
of the Statute of Elizabeth, codifying and distilling the cases in an
attempt to produce objective tests for classifying a transfer as sufficiently
"fraudulent" to allow creditors to ignore the suspect transaction and
levy upon the items transferred.
The UFCA was revised three times prior to its adoption. Each draft
sought to validate certain gifts against creditor attack.16 The initial
classification chosen upheld such transfers if the transferor was not left
in one of three discrete descriptions of financial conditions. These con-
"
2One attempt was made in Gately v. Kappler, 209 Mass. 426, 95 N.E. 859 (1911),
in which the court held that it was appropriate for a transferor to provide against unknown
risks, but not to make transfers that unreasonably protected against known debts. Id. at
427-28, 95 N.E. at 859.
"
3Compare 0. BuMp, supra note 31, § 255, at 295 (debts guaranteed or which are
co-endorsed not counted for purposes of insolvency) with M. BIGELOW, supra note 27,
Ch. VIII, § 3, at 234-35 (opposite).
Indeed, one of the main purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was
to resolve the split among the states over the validity of gifts as against future creditors.
See Prefatory Note to UFCA, 7A U.L.A. 427, 428 (1985); Report of the Committee on
Uniform State Laws, 5 A.B.A.J. 481, 492 n.2 (1919).
"See supra note 1.
"17A U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 1988). Nebraska was the last to adopt it, and did so in
1980. Id. It also has been adopted in the Virgin Islands. Id.
The UFCA's influence, however, extends beyond those states which have adopted it
by statute. Some states which have not enacted the UFCA have accepted its provisions
as accurate restatements of the received learning of the Statute of Elizabeth. Molitor v.
Molitor, 184 Conn. 530, 535, 440 A.2d 215, 218 (1981) (finding that the UFCA "is largely
an adoption and clarification of the standards of the common law.").
"6See supra note 83.
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ditions, however, were further distinguished on the basis of what type
of creditors could use them.
One sticking point in this classification scheme was the appropriate
circumstances under which future creditors could attack a constructively
fraudulent transfer. The first draft of the UFCA, delivered to the
Conference in 1916,87 contained the forerunner of section 5 of the current
UFCA, which attempted to answer this question." As promulgated, this
section provided that a voluntary conveyance for less than fair consid-
eration could be set aside if "the person making it is engaged or is
about to engage in a hazardous business or transaction involving risks
exceeding his remaining assets."8 9 Standing to challenge such transfers
was extended to "persons who become creditors . . . as the result of
obligations entered into or acts done during the continuation of such
business or transaction. "90
The Conference recommitted the draft to committee. 91 The second
draft, promulgated in 1917,92 significantly changed the text of proposed
section 5. It dropped the "hazardous business" concept, and inserted
in its place the current language regarding unreasonably small capital. 93
No explanation for the change was made; indeed, the reporter used the
same explanatory notes to elaborate the origins of the section.
94
The text was again returned to committee. 95 The third and final
draft of the UFCA was presented in 1918 at the Conference's annual
meeting in Cleveland.96 Although the text of section 5 had not changed, 97
controversy apparently surrounded it. Immediately prior to adoption of
the motion recommending the UFCA to all the states, a motion was
made to exclude section 5 from the Conference's recommendation. 9 No
1
7UFCA (First Tentative Draft), reprinted in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 254 (1916) [hereinafter
1916 PROCEEDINGS].
uUFCA § 5 (First Tentative Draft), reprinted in id., at 258.
9 1d.
%OId.
9
'See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 249 (1917) [hereinafter 1917 PROCEEDINGS].
92UFCA (Second Tentative Draft), reprinted in id., at 250.
913UFCA § 5 (Second Tentative Draft), reprinted in id., at 254.
Id. at 255.
"Id. at 65-66.
"UFCA (Third Tentative Draft), reprinted in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 348 (1918).
91d. at 353.
91Id. at 52.
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other section was singled out for this exclusion. While this motion to
exclude ultimately was defeated, the vote was close; of the twenty-nine
states present, only sixteen voted to keep section 5 of the Act. 99 Of the
remaining thirteen states, twelve voted to exclude section 5, and one
state was divided.1° Thus born in controversy, section 5 was presented
to the states.
C. The Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act
Many states soon adopted the UFCA.' 0' Following this lead, Congress
in 1938 adopted, almost verbatim, the text of the UFCA as the federal
fraudulent transfer standard in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act).102 The
legislative history lauded the UFCA as incorporating the better reasoned
cases under the Statute of Elizabeth. 03 Although not adopted, language
stating that the federal statute should be interpreted consistently with
the UFCA was suggested. °4
The enactment of the present Bankruptcy Code (Code)105 in 1978
was the first major revision to the statutory text of fraudulent transfer
law. The Code revised the treatment of the characterization of exchange;
"reasonably equivalent value" rather than "fair consideration" became
the test. 10 6 The financial stringency test of "unreasonably small capital,"
"9Id.
IOId.
'"'It was ultimately adopted by twenty-five states and the Virgin Islands. See 7A
U.L.A. 427 (1985).
"
2The text was added by amendments to the 1898 Act, known generally as the
Chandler Act. Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 875 (repealed 1979).
'1"We have condensed the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
retaining its substance, and, as far as possible, its language." NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
CONFERENCE, ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (Comm. Print 1936).
I-id. at 217. Notwithstanding the omission from the final text, one leading com-
mentator states that powerful considerations should be shown to justify a federal court
in departing from well reasoned interpretations of the Uniform Act. 4 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 79, 548.01, at 548-18 n.25.
'See supra note I.
"'°The two terms were intended to be equivalent with respect to the measurement of
the amount of consideration. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, Part I, at 211; Comment,
Guaranties and Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 198
n.18 (1985) (citing other relevant legislative history). Under the UFCA, however, "fair
consideration" also includes the concept of good faith. UFCA, supra note 1, § 3. See
generally Comment, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REV. 495
(1983). The Code and UFTA break out the concept of good faith from the concept of
consideration, and make it an affirmative defense, validating the transfer or the obligation
to the extent the transferee gave with good faith. II U.S.C. §§ 548(c) (1982) (initial
transferee); 550(b) (mediate and intermediate transferees); UFTA, supra note 1, §§ 8(a),
(d) (same).
[Vol. 21:469
FRA UDULENT TRANSFERS
however, remained the same, and the reach of the section was expanded
from conveyances to "obligations incurred."'' 7
Although the substantive requirements for other types of fraudulent
transfers were little changed, the Code significantly altered (although it
purported not to) the section condemning transfers by insolvents. In
adopting the insolvency test previously used to test "acts of bankruptcy"' 08
and other matters' 09-that of liabilities exceeding assets "at a fair
valuation""°-the Code rejected the Act's and the UFCA's reliance on
asset valuation at a "present fair salable value.""' The difference between
the two tests was known," 2 and is significant." 3 The Code thus makes
proof of insolvency a much more difficult task.
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)," 4 when promulgated
in 1984, adopted most of the Code's changes. Indeed, one of the UFTA's
10711 U.S.C. § 548(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982). See also supra note 8 for a discussion of the
differences between the text of the Code and the UFCA.
'°See, e.g., Act, supra note 1, §§ 3(a)(3), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(3) (repealed 1979)
(suffering imposition of a lien while insolvent); 3(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (repealed
1979) (appointment of a receiver or trustee while insolvent).
'he Act used the "fair valuation" formula in determining whether a person was
insolvent for purposes of assessing preferences. Act, supra note 1, § 60, II U.S.C. § 96
(repealed 1979). In addition, under Chapter X of the Act, II U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (repealed
1979), a finding of insolvency permitted a court to appoint a receiver. Id. at § 115, 11
U.S.C. § 515 (repealed 1979), and triggered certain protections for dissenting shareholders.
Id. § 216(8), 11 U.S.C. § 616(8) (repealed 1979).
"
0
"A person shall be deemed insolvent ... whenever the aggregate of his property,
... shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." Act, supra
note 1, § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (repealed 1979). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1982)
(" 'insolvent' means ... financial condition such that the sum of the entity's debts is
greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation ....") (emphasis added).
"'See Act, supra note 1, § 67(1)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(l)(d) (repealed 1979).
"'See e.g., Holahan v. Lewis, 182 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Fla. 1960). In that case the
court stated:
The Court construes the definition of insolvency as defined in Section 107 as
the controlling one in the application of Section 107 sub. d(2)(a) et. seq. The
definition of insolvency as enunciated in Section 1, Subdivision 19, carries a
far broader sweep than does Section 107. It is apparent that Congress intended
less stringent proof of insolvency in Section 107 than in other phases of bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
Id. at 476-77. See also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, at § 272.
"'Early courts noted this difference and specifically found that the "fair valuation"
test produced a more liberal and higher total asset value than did the present fair valuation
standard. In re Crystal Ice & Fuel Co., 283 F. 1007, 1009-10 (D. Mont. 1922); Stern v.
Paper, 183 F. 228, 231 (D.N.D. 1910) (court noted that the fair valuation standard is
"liberal" and "ought not to be enlarged."). See also Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., Inc.
v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 498 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Meyer v. General American
Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 1977). Professor Glenn argued early and strenuously
for the abolition of the fair valuation test in favor of one such as was adopted in the
UFCA. I G. GLENN, supra note 1, at § 272.
1"4See supra note 1.
INDIANA LA W REVIEW
implied purposes was to conform the uniform state law with the Code." '5
The UFTA, for example, adopts the reasonably equivalent value test," 16
and the Code's extension of the action to obligations. 1 7 It also adopts
the Code's revised formulation of insolvency." 8
The UFTA, however, broke some new ground. It changes the for-
mulation of section 5's financial stringency condition to "unreasonably
small assets.""19 The UFTA defines "assets" as non-exempt property
which is not subject to a valid lien. E0 This change was made to avoid
confusing working capital concepts-which are the heart of the section-
with corporate law concepts of paid in capita1' 21-which are irrelevant
to fraudulent transfer law. 2 2 The focus has thus been shifted from
adequacy at inception to adequacy at all reasonably foreseeable times.
The UFTA has been rapidly adopted by at least seventeen states, 23
with some inevitable variations, mostly in the UFTA's resurrection of
badges of fraud. 24 What remains fairly constant, however, is the thrust
"'See Prefatory Note to UFTA, reprinted in 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
"6UFTA, supra note 1, §§ 4(a)(2); 5(a).
"'UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i). See also supra note 8.
"'UFTA, supra note 1, § 2. The UFTA expands upon the Code's definition, however,
by creating a rebuttable presumption of insolvency if a transferor is not "generally paying
its debts as they become due." Id. § 2(b). See Cook & Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 91-92 (1988).
In the context of passing the UFTA, at least one state has tackled head on the issue
of the valuation of assets, adopting views which would have eliminated much of the recent
furor fraudulent transfer law has caused. See, e.g., Comments (6) and (7) to proposed
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3439.02, CAL. ASSEMBLY J., supra note 7, at 8574-75 (valuation of
contingent debts).
"'UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i).
120UFTA, supra note 1, § 1(2).
'
2
'For cases apparently using corporate capital concepts, see, e.g., Diller v. Irving
Trust Co. (In re College Chemists, Inc.), 62 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1933); Wells Fargo Bank
v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d
225 (9th Cir. 1980).
"
2 Reporter's Note to UFCA § 4, 7A U.L.A. 654 (1985). See also Comment (4) to
Proposed Section 3439.04 of the CAL. CIv. CODE, CAL. ASSEMBLY J., supra note 7, at
8577.
'
23These are: Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, and West Virginia. 7A U.L.A. 88 (Supp. 1988). Of these seventeen, only
nine, California, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota and Washington, had adopted the UFCA. Id.
-California, for example, did not adopt the UFTA recitation of badges of fraud
as indicia of transfers made with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3439.04 (West Supp. 1988). It did, however, list those badges of fraud in the
legislative history as a "nonexclusive list of some facts which courts have considered . . ."
in finding actual intent. Comment (5) to Proposed Section 3439.04 of the CAL. CIv. CODE,
CAL. ASSEMBLY J., supra note 7, at 8577.
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of the section as deterring transfers for less than reasonably equivalent
value by businesses bordering on insolvency.
III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Despite the basic textual differences in the various sources of fraud-
ulent transfer law, the cases are not so diverse. Indeed, with but a few
exceptions, the cases have been true to the original limited intent of the
section. It is to a brief review of these cases that this article now turns.
A. Interpretations of Section 5
After the promulgation of the UFCA, section 5 received little in-
dependent notice. 125 The case law that did develop, however, did little
to illuminate the basic question: what is the scope of the unreasonably
small capital section? Several false starts occurred. One view concentrated
on the transferor's "working capital"-loosely defined as the excess of
current assets over current liabilities. 2 6 Another looked to a transferor's
"capitalization," taken to be the amount of assets placed at risk in the
business. 127
The main view, to the extent that one developed, focused on the
transferor's ability to marshal sufficient cash, either from operations,
equity infusions, new loans or some combination of these, to pay expected
creditors.1 2s These cases took a forward looking view, comparing antic-
ipated cash flow against anticipated debt incurrence. 2 9
Most cases, however, avoided taking sides with these definitional
issues, and instead developed per se rules derived from other fraudulent
conveyance law notions, and from corporate law generally. 30 Section
5's history, however, as well as the historical purpose of promoting
'"See supra note 15.
'
26See, e.g., Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Okla. 1966), aff'd 389 F.2d
233 (10th Cir. 1968); Zuk v. Hale, 114 N.H. 813, 330 A.2d 448 (1974).
12'See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, 475 F. Supp. 693 (D.
Nev. 1978) ("The primary intent of this statute is to prevent an under-capitalized company
from being thrust into the market place to attract unwary creditors to inevitable loss while
one or more preferred creditors are provided relative safety of a security interest in the
company's assets."), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980).
I'Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal.
1985); Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Okla. 1966), aff'd, 389 F.2d 233 (10th
Cir. 1968); In re Atlas Foundry Co., 155 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 1957); Jacobson v. First
State Bank of Benson (In re Jacobson), 48 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); Jenney
v. Vining, 120 N.H. 377, 415 A.2d 681 (1980).
129See, e.g., Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175
(C.D. Cal. 1985).
130See infra text accompanying notes 136 to 166.
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"true and plain dealing,"' 3  both augur against such iron clad and
inflexible rules. Section 5 was created to address perceived inadequacies
in section 4'3 -dealing with transfers by insolvents-and even then its
adoption was only by a narrow margin.'33 This uncritical expansion not
only ignores the section's historical roots, but also ignores the current
role of fraudulent transfers involving unreasonably small capital.
B. Uncritical Expansion of the Action
Since its enactment, two lines of cases have expanded the scope of
the unreasonably small capital action in unjustifiable ways. The first
line of these cases declared that a pledge of all or substantially all of
a company's assets ipso facto leaves the transferor with unreasonably
small capital. 3 4 The second line holds that a finding of insolvency is
per se a finding of unreasonably small capital.'35 These cases, at first
glance, seem to provide certainty to a confusing area of the law. In
reality, however, they preserve an ossified and incorrect view of fraudulent
transfer law, and an examination of their reasoning demonstrates their
lack of continuing validity.
1. Encumbrance of All Assets.-A few cases have held that if a
company has little or no unencumbered assets, it automatically has
unreasonably small capital. The seminal case for this proposition is Diller
v. Irving Trust Co. (In re College Chemists, Inc.). 3 6 There, Diller had
sold all of the shares of her company, College Chemists, Inc., to
Weiner. 3 7 Weiner agreed to pay the purchase price by causing his new
company, College Chemists, to grant Diller a security interest in all of
its assets.' 38 When College Chemists was declared bankrupt, the trustee
in bankruptcy sued to invalidate the security interest and succeeded. The
basis of its claim was that the transfer of the security interest was a
fraudulent conveyance of the unreasonably small capital variety. 3 9
The Second Circuit, in a one page per curiam opinion, affirmed
the invalidation. The court had no problem finding unreasonably small
capital, because it determined that "there was no capital at all, because
" See supra text accompanying notes 18 to 21.
'12See supra note 71.
"See supra notes 99-100.
1'1See infra text accompanying notes 136 to 158.
"'See infra text accompanying notes 159 to 166.
M62 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1933) (per curiam).
1371d.
1381d.
1Id. The Second Circuit's opinion is silent with regard to whether the trustee had
also sought to show that College Chemists had been made insolvent by the transfer.
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Weiner's debt was more than its value.' °4 0 In short, by counting the
acquisition debt, College Chemists' balance sheet liabilities exceeded its
balance sheet assets. To allow the pledge to stand, in the court's view,
would allow "Weiner to carry on the business on an expectancy of
profit."'' 4' The rule in College Chemists has been followed at least three
times, in each case without detailed analysis. 42 Although the circum-
stances present in each of these cases may have presented a sufficient
factual basis for their result, they certainly do not compel automatic
relief.
As recognized by several recent cases, 43 it does not necessarily follow
that the lack of unencumbered assets constitutes "unreasonably small"
capital. These cases focus on several factors tending to establish the
availability of cash to operate the business, rather than on a single factor
such as a lack of unencumbered assets. For example, in Credit Managers
Associations of Southern California v. Federal Co.,' 44 General Electric
Credit Corp. ("GECC"), a well-known asset-based lender, lent over seven
million dollars in a management-lead leveraged buyout. When a labor
strike and other setbacks caused financial problems, GECC increased
its line by over two and one-half million dollars. 4 The court properly
considered this an appropriate and anticipated source of capital. 146
Similarly, in Allied Products Corp. v. Arrow Freightways, Inc. ,'14 7
the New Mexico Supreme Court was faced with the exact situation in
College Chemists: a sale of a business in which the buyer caused its
new company to secure the deferred portion of the purchase price with
140Id. at 1058. The court seemed to infer that the purchase price had been too high;
since "Weiner's debt" equalled the purchase price, the "value" of the assets could only
be less than that amount if Weiner paid too much, with the result that Diller received
a debt in excess of the value of the assets sold. The Second Circuit confirmed this reading
in Teitelbaum v. Voss (In re Tuller's, Inc.), 480 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1973). There, under
essentially the same facts as in College Chemists, the court stated that the security interest
in favor of the departing shareholders "left [the transferor] with all of its tangible assets
mortgaged. It was [thus] effectively devoid of capital .... In re Tuller's, 480 F.2d at
52.
"College Chemists, 62 F.2d at 1058.
"'Teitelbaum v. Voss (In re Tuller's, Inc.), 480 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1973); Pirrone
v. Toboroff (In re Vaniman Int'l, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 166, 186 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Sharrer v. Sandlas, 103 A.D.2d 873, 477 N.Y.S.2d 897, motion for leave to appeal denied,
63 N.Y.2d 610, 473 N.E.2d 1190, 484 N.Y.S.2d 1024 (1984), reargument denied, 64 N.Y.2d
885, 476 N.E.2d 1008, 487 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1985). Accord In re Atlas Foundry Co.,
155 F. Supp. 615, 617 (D.N.J. 1957) (court found that encumbrance of assets to finance
leveraged acquisition reduced the "free assets of the bankrupt corporation to a point too
low to permit it to carry on its operations with safety.").
"'4See infra text accompanying notes 144 to 158.
"629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
1'1d. at 186.
"ld. at 184.
1'7104 N.M. 544, 724 P.2d 752 (1986).
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the company's own assets. In Allied Products, however, the new owner
invested over $100,000, personally guaranteed over $250,000 in trade
debt, and renegotiated other debt. 48 Although the court found that the
"security interests made future financing difficult, if not impossible,"'' 49
it also found, presumably from the new owner's efforts and investments,
that there was "uncontradicted testimony" as to remaining capital. 50
The rule of College Chemists ignores these alternative sources of
operating capital. As established in Credit Managers and in Allied Prod-
ucts, borrowing against or selling unencumbered assets is only one of
many commercially reasonable methods of raising cash. A company may
seek additional equity capital, either through capital contributions from
existing owners or by the sale of equity interests to new investors.", It
may issue unsecured debt. If there is a senior blanket security interest,
a new lender may lend more on the same assets secured by a junior
lien, the existing lender may itself lend more, or the existing lender may
subordinate its interest to a new lender. In short, even though debt may
exceed aggregate asset value, as was the case in College Chemists, many
avenues exist to funnel cash into the company.
In addition to this failure to consider all possible sources of operating
capital, College Chemists and its progeny disregard the true economic
effect of the types of transactions involved. The transaction examined
in College Chemists involved a pattern familiar to acquisitions generally;
a portion of the consideration passing to the selling equity interests is
deferred and expected to be paid from future profits of the business
sold. The buyer, in turn, uses its newly acquired control to cause the
company bought to secure the deferral with the assets of the company
sold. Recently, these transactions have been called leveraged buyouts.',52
College Chemists condemns these transactions, based upon the view that
such transfers allow the transferor to conduct business on "an expectancy
of profit,"' 53 presumably for the sole benefit of the transferor. But in
1'Id. at 545, 724 P.2d at 753.
491d. at 548, 724 P.2d at 756.
1oId.
-Professor Clark has recognized that the provision of additional equity can be
relevant. Clark, supra note 1, at 560.
112See generally Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73 (1985);
Baird & Jackson, supra note 6; Comment, supra note 1. Indeed, some commentators have
indicated that the new UFTA may be more lenient in allowing successful fraudulent transfer
attacks on leveraged buyouts. Cook & Mendales, supra note 118, at 91 ("a leveraged
acquisition that left a corporation with little or no unencumbered property would be even
more readily subject to attack than under present law").
"'Diller v. Irving Trust Co. (In re College Chemists, Inc.), 62 F.2d 1058, 1058 (2d
Cir. 1933). See also Mackay v. Douglas, 14 L.R.-Eq. 106, 121, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 721, 723
(Ch. 1872) (characterizing the thought process of someone who transfers assets in trust
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College Chemists the person benefitting from the transfer-the seller-
was not the transferor. In short, in a leveraged buyout, the "culprit,"
if any, is the departing equity owners. It is decidedly not the third party
financing the transaction.
Two observations flow from this review of the position of the parties.
If a third party finances the leveraged buyout, setting aside its lien or
obligation may automatically give rise to an action by the financing
party for return of the loan funds or other consideration on equitable
theories such as unjust enrichment. 5 4 Accordingly, in the bankruptcy
context the remedy of invalidation is not without its detractions.'
Second, since the real flow of funds is from the operating company to
its departing shareholders, a question exists whether fraudulent transfer
law even applies. 5 6 State laws on dividend restrictions exist for the
protection of creditors against shareholders' ability to divert corporate
funds. 5 7 Not only are these statutes crafted to deal directly with this
type of transfer, but the original drafters of the UFCA declined to
include such a section in the UFCA, even though it had been proposed
prior to going into a new business as follows: '"I am going into trade; I believe I may
make a great deal of money by it, but nobody knows what may happen, therefore I will
make myself safe. I will make this large fortune safe by settling it on my wife and
children absolutely."').
"'See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 17 (1937) (person who has paid money or void
or voidable agreement may receive restitution). See also Stratton v. Harming, 139 Cal.
App. 2d 723, 727, 294 P.2d 66, 68 (1956).
'In a state court setting, the issue is typically one of priorities between two creditors,
the plaintiff and the transferee/defendant. In a bankruptcy context, however, the plaintiff
represents all creditors, and the benefits of the avoided transfer are preserved for the
benefit of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1978). Invalidating a transfer and
reducing the status of that lien creditor to one of an unsecured creditor may or may not
help other unsecured creditors. See, e.g., H. Rep. 595, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977);
S. Rep. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1982). For example, if significant unencumbered
assets existed prior to invalidation, and the claim sought to be invalidated was undersecured,
the result of a successful action might be detrimental to unsecured creditors, i.e., it would
result in a lesser dividend. Accordingly, the rights inuring to the benefit of a defeated
lien creditor are important, and must be considered by the debtor or trustee. Further
subordination, to that of equity interests, would require additional and more egregious
acts. See generally Bank of New Richmond v. Production Credit Ass'n of River Falls
(In re Osborne), 42 Bankr. 988, 996-97 (W.D. Wisc. 1984); DeNatale & Abram, The
Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus.
LAW. 417 (1985).
'
6AIthough cases exist which permit a fraudulent conveyance attack on dividend
payments, these cases do not critically consider the policy reasons, examined infra at note
158, as to why fraudulent transfer law ought not to be so extended. Consove v. Cohen
(In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 982 (lst Cir. 1983); Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, 137
Cal. App. 3d 524, 187 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1983).
"'See Prefatory Note to UFTA, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
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in the first draft.18 Against this background, it makes little sense to
bring fraudulent transfer law to bear upon the problem, let alone erect
a per se rule against such transactions.
2. From Insolvency Directly to Unreasonably Small Capital.-A
second line of cases has developed another unwarranted per se rule:
that a finding of insolvency is automatically a finding of unreasonably
small capital. 5 9 This rule does violence to the carefully structured standing
rules applicable to fraudulent transfers and achieves results inconsistent
with the UFCA's original intent. As such, it should be repudiated.
The vice of this rule is demonstrated by recalling the standing rules
for fraudulent transfers: a transfer which renders a transferor insolvent
may be attacked by any of the transferor's then-existing creditors, but
not by creditors whose debts arise after the transfer. The rationale for
this distinction is that future creditors at least have the opportunity to
inquire as to the transferor's financial condition and decline to trade
if the information obtained was negative.' 6° Those who were creditors
at the time of the transaction had no such opportunity.
"'Section 8 of the First Tentative Draft of the UFCA was entitled "Payment of
Dividend by Corporation." 1916 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 87, at 259-60. The Second
Tentative Draft omitted this section "as belonging to a Corporation [Act] rather than a
Fraudulent Conveyance Act." 1917 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 91, at 258. Professor Glenn
also believed that restrictions on corporate dividends were not the province of fraudulent
conveyance laws. I G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 604, at 1043-47. See also Coquillette, supra
note 71, at 446-48.
Professor Clark argues strenuously for coverage of corporate dividends by fraudulent
transfer laws, based in part on his view that dividend restriction statutes are "virtually
meaningless" because they are rigid, bright line tests, focusing on "formalistic accounting
conventions" rather than on the UFCA's "purposive concept of capital." Clark, supra
note 1, at 556, 558-59 n.154. Professor Clark seems to discount the UFCA's historical
origins, and also gives too little deference to state legislatures in the control of the corporate
creatures they create. Instead, he exalts the flexibility of the common law over the perceived
restricting influence of legislation. It makes little sense, however, to enact statutes specifically
designed to regulate the shareholder/corporation relationship if common law concepts will
always, or nearly always, usurp their function. Given the set of balances a legislative
body strikes in creating corporations with their limited liability to exist, Professor Clark's
position seems to pass wide of the mark.
'
5 United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 556, 580 (M.D.
Pa. 1983), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288
(3d Cir. 1986); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Adler, 2 Bankr. 752,
756 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.), 76 Bankr. 523, 529 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1987); Louisiana Indust. Coatings, Inc. v. Pertuit (In re Louisiana Indust.
Coatings, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 688, 698 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1983) ("A negative capital position
represents ipso facto an unreasonably small capital with which to do any business")
(emphasis in original).
'6°Crumbaugh v. Kugler, 2 Ohio St. 374, 379 (1854) (subsequent creditors "give credit
to their debtor as he is-for what he has, not for what he once had"); Monroe v. Smith,
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In contrast, a transfer which leaves a transferor with unreasonably
small capital may be attacked not only by present creditors, but future
creditors as well. This standing rule derives from the historical antecedents
of the section that equated "securing against the hazards of business"
with fraud on future creditors, since they were the target of the malign
intent. 161
Regardless of the origin of the distinction in standing, however, the
distinction exists. At bottom, it implies strongly that a transferor may
be insolvent, and yet still retain an adequate amount of capital or cash
flow. This proposition is not as wild as it may first seem: insolvency
under the UFCA developed into an incredibly creditor-protective cal-
culation. Assets which could not be quickly sold were given no value,
regardless of their cost; 162 contingent assets could be disregarded; 63 and
guaranties and other contingent obligations were valued at face, 64 with
little consideration of offsetting rights. 165 As a consequence, companies
which held relatively liquid assets such as land could quite easily be
insolvent, but could still operate effectively and could generate sufficient
79 Pa. 459, 462 (1876) ("It is difficult to perceive how one who had knowledge of such
a conveyance before he dealt with the grantor, and hence must have acted in view of it,
could, by any possibility, be defrauded thereby"). See also Todd v. Nelson, 109 N.Y.
794, 797, 16 N.E. 360, 364-65 (1888).
'
6
1Schreyer v. Scott, 134 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1890); Winchester v. Charter, 94 Mass.
(12 Allen) 606, 610-11 (1866); D. MOORE, supra note 47, § 8, at 277.
'16Corbin v. Franklin Nat'l Bank (In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Securities Litigation),
2 Bankr. 687, 711-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 203 (2d. Cir. 1980) (book
value of stock of subsidiary had no present fair salable value; court reasoned that since
"there were no purchasers or bidders for [the stock] in May and June of 1974, [the]
stock, realistically speaking, had no value."); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States Trust
Co., 236 App. Div. 500, 503, 260 N.Y.S. 40, 44 (1932) ("Not every asset, but only such
as are salable, enter the equation."); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh,
313 Pa. 467, 169 A. 209 (1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934) (reversing trial court's
refusal to give "present" controlling meaning).
16'See, e.g., Kepler v. Atkinson (In re Atkinson), 63 Bankr. 266, 269 (Bankr. W.D.
Wisc. 1986) (unmatured claim against insolvent person has no value under Wisconsin
version of UFCA). Cf. Wight v. Rohlffs, 48 Cal. App. 2d 696, 121 P.2d 76 (1942) (under
precursor of UFCA; court only considered assets subject to court process in California
and excluded consideration of transferor's interest in Massachusetts probate estate).
-'Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. Oppenheim, 109 Misc. 2d 649, 652, 440 N.Y.S.2d
829, 831 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Marine Midland Bank v. Stein, 105 Misc. 2d 768, 770,
433 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (Sup. Ct. 1980). But cf. Cate v. Nicely (In re Knox Kreations,
Inc.), 474 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981) (corporate guaranty which was not likely to be
enforced not counted as liability under Tennessee version of UFCA); In re Xonics
Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1988) (contingent liabilities must be dis-
counted to reflect probability that contingency will materialize).
'
6
'Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., Inc. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 499 (N.D.
Cal. 1980); Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul (In re American Lumber Co.), 5
Bankr. 470, 475-76 (D. Minn. 1980); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 79, 101.3115],
at 101-66.
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capital to augment the existing capital base. 166 Therefore, the application
of a per se rule subsuming unreasonably small capital within insolvency
would appear unwarranted. Its blind application produces an antinomy;
the automatic extension of standing to future creditors upon proof of
insolvency-which is a result consciously not included in the statute.
These two per se rules combine with the intensely fact-bound nature
of the analysis in all other cases to create a featureless framework for
critical analysis of unreasonably small capital cases. Given the action's
history, and the general trend of current case law, a synthesis is possible
which contains a principled and logical analytical framework for future
cases. It is to that task that this article now turns.
IV. TOWARD TRUE AND PLAIN DEALING: A PROPOSED SYNTHESIS
With the Code's and the UFTA's softening of creditor-protective
definitions of insolvency, 167 lawyers seeking to set aside questionable
transfers will inevitably come to rely more heavily upon the unreasonably
small capital section.16' It does not require proof of insolvency and
neatly avoids the issue of standing. In addition, the case law interpreting
the section is scarce and, at best, cryptic, allowing for good faith
arguments for expansion.
Against this background, it is inevitable that arguments will arise
pressing for new or expansive interpretations of this action.' 69 Fast
application of the new UFTA or the new provisions of the Code may,
however, outpace the original intent behind the action; that is, curing
specific perceived deficiencies with the concept of insolvency. 70 The
received learning and the jurisprudence of section 5 argue against such
easy applications.
In addition, the frailties of the two lines of cases set forth above
can point to a better understanding of the unreasonably small capital
action. First, the deficiencies of College Chemists and its progeny un-
' Cf. American Insulator Co. v. Marsh Plastics, Inc. (In re American Insulator Co.),
60 Bankr. 752, 755 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (valuation of land acquired in 1920 at cost,
as indicated by applicable rule, would unduly skew insolvency calculation in favor of
insolvency; recent appraisals used instead).
1'6See supra text accompanying notes 108 to 113.
161See, e.g., Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. FORUM 527, 560 (categorizing application of unreasonably
small assets test of UFTA as "easy, even tautological" in the case of failed businesses);
Cook & Mendales, supra note 118, at 91 ("a leveraged acquisition that left a corporation
with little or no unencumbered property would be even more readily subject to attack
than under present law").
,Id.
1°0See supra text accompanying notes 70 to 72.
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derscore the importance of a broad definition of capital. 7' Next, the
inherent contradiction of cases making the unwarranted leap from in-
solvency to unreasonably small capital shows that inadequacy of capital
must stand on its own ground to preserve the structure created by the
standing rules of both the UFCA and the UFTA.172 Each of these concerns
is addressed below.
A. Defining "Capital"
Initially, in order to determine what is "unreasonably small" capital,
the definition of "capital" or "assets"' 73 must be made clear. One recent
case surmised that it was "the unadjusted value of all assets, however
encumbered.' ' 74 The UFTA definition of "assets," however, rejects this
view by explicitly excluding "assets" to the extent they are subject to
valid encumbrances."'7 Also rejected is any notion that "capital" includes
only invested or "risk" capital, 76 and the notion that "capital" consists
only of free or unencumbered assets. 177
So much for what "capital" is not. Some hint of what it is can
be gleaned from the text of the statute. Both the Code and the UFTA
require that the "capital" or "assets" be adequate "in relation to the
[transferor's] business or transaction."'' 78 This formulation forces a for-
ward looking view; it requires a transferor to retain adequate wherewithal
for future businesses or transactions.
1'7See supra text accompanying notes 150 to 152.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 159 to 166.
"'The remainder of this article will refer to "capital" rather than assets. This use
comports with the intent of the UFTA to clarify, rather than change, the scope of the
section. See Reporter's Note to UFTA § 4(b)(1), 7A U.L.A. 654 (1985).
7Jacobson v. First State Bank of Benson (In re Jacobson), 48 Bankr. 497, 501
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
'"Section 1(2) defines "asset" to mean "property of a debtor, but the term does
not include: (i) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien . (emphasis
supplied). Cf. Comment (3) to Proposed Section 3439.04 of the CAL. CiV. CODE, CAL. ASSEMBLY
J., supra note 7, at 8576-77 ("The premise of this Act is that when a transfer is for
security only, the equity or value of the asset that exceeds the amount of the debt secured
remains available to unsecured creditors and thus cannot be regarded as the subject of
a fraudulent transfer merely because of the encumbrance resulting from an otherwise valid
security transfer.").
176"The reference to 'capital' in the [UFCA] is ambiguous in that it may refer to
net worth or to the par value of stock or to the consideration received for the stock
issued. The special meanings of 'capital' in corporation law have no relevance in the law
of fraudulent transfers." Comment (4) to Proposed Section 3439.04 of the CAL. Crv. CODE,
CAL. ASSEMBLY J. 8569, supra note 7, at 8577. See also Reporter's Note to UFTA § 4,
7A U.L.A. 654 (1985).
'See supra text accompanying notes 136 to 158; Clark, supra note 1, at 555 n.140
(equating "net worth" with "capital").
"11 U.S.C. § 548(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982); UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i).
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Courts have recognized this perspective; "capital" has been extended
to reasonably foreseeable future cash flow, be it from operations,179
equity capital infusions, 80 residual equity in equipment obtained through
the use of purchase money financing'' or new and commercially rea-
sonable loans.8 2 As a consequence, the test for unreasonably small
"capital" should include these concepts; the aggregate amount of "cap-
ital," in short, would include all reasonably anticipated sources of
operating funds, which may include new equity infusions, cash from
operations or cash from secured or unsecured loans over the relevant
period. 83
B. Determining "Unreasonably Small" Amounts of Capital
If capital comprises all available cash resources over the relevant
period, what constitutes "unreasonably small" amounts of it? An outline
of the answer can be given by examining existing unreasonably small
capital cases for the elements of a successful case.' 4 This examination
"'Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 184 (C.D.
Cal. 1985) (consideration of future cash flow from operations in determining whether
remaining capital was sufficient).
" Allied Products Corp. v. Arrow Freightways, Inc., 104 N.M. 544, 724 P.2d 752
(1986); Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 77 Bankr. 754,
762 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (failure of witness to consider effect of principal shareholder's secured
guaranty a factor in not believing testimony regarding unreasonably small capital), aff'd
sub nom. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
"'Lackawanna Pants Mfg. Co. v. Wiseman, 133 F.2d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 1943).
"'
21d. (court considered commercial reasonableness of purchase money chattel mort-
gage); Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (court considered, after increase had occurred, likelihood at time of transfer that
primary lender would increase credit line). See also Kupetz v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank
and Trust Co. of Chicago, 77 Bankr. 754, 762 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (failure of witness to
consider possible refinancing or new loans a factor in not accepting witness' conclusion
of unreasonably small capital), aff'd sub nom. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
"'As used in this context, "relevant period" means that time span from the date of
the transfer to the date of non-payment, limited only by the applicable statute of limitations.
By way of example, if the statute of limitations is four years, the non-payment occurs
one year after the transfer, but the transferor's expected capital, when judged from the
vantage point of transfer, would have been adequate for three years, no action will lie.
See infra text accompanying notes 235-54. Similarly, under this hypothetical, no action
will lie for any failures to pay which occur after four years due to the bar of the statute
of limitations. Finally, again under this hypothetical, a non-payment which occurs three
and one-half years after the transfer-within the four year statute of limitations but beyond
the period of adequacy of capital-would be actionable.
"'in this outline, pre-UFCA cases and authorities are used. This use is not only
appropriate given the paucity of section 5 cases, see supra note 15, but also due to the
uncertain origins of section 5 itself. As noted above, section 5 was hotly contested in the
original convention which adopted the UFCA. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
This disagreement indicates that the final text was less than a perfect fit for the concept
as developed by the common law. The use of pre-UFCA cases to tailor the unreasonably
small capital action as an accessory and adjunct to the insolvency branch of constructively
fraudulent transfers should thus be permissible.
[Vol. 21:469
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
demonstrates that, by definition, the challenger must first establish that
the transfer was for less than a reasonably equivalent value. Once shown,
the creditor must then show the following: the transfer was made by
a person in business or for a business transaction; that non-payment of
the plaintiff's claim was a reasonably foreseeable effect given the amount
of the transferor's remaining and reasonably foreseeable cash resources;
and that, in at least a "but for" sense, the lack of adequate resources
caused the non-payment.
1. The First Requirement: A Business or Business Transaction.-
The first requirement is textual: a transfer must be made by one who
is "engaged or is about to engage in a business."'' 5 Additionally, the
business must be one that requires working capital, or liquid funds, in
the business' daily activities.8 6 The historical antecedent for this re-
quirement lies in the notion that carrying on a business is an implicit
representation of an ability to pay those debts incurred in the business;
no such requirement attends to individuals in their personal affairs.8 7
The statute also extends to those "engaged or . . . about to engage
in a . . . transaction" for which the remaining property is inadequate.1 8 1
The statute is silent as to the distinction between a "business" and a
"transaction." One case, however, has interpreted "transaction" to cover
joint ventures; that is,temporary associations to achieve a limited business
purpose.8 9 This reading is consistent with the text of the original statute;
1'1UFCA, supra note 1, § 5 (emphasis supplied). See also II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(1982); UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i).
'
6lannacone v. Capital City Bank (In re Richards), 58 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1986) (company which merely held title to assets for purposes of securing a debt was not
engaged in business which needed capital); Jacobson v. First State Bank of Benson (In
re Jacobson), 48 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (section 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) found in-
applicable because, although debtor was in business, no showing that additional capital
was necessary; indeed, transferee showed that business could be run more effectively with
the use of less capital). Cf. Tarbox v. Zeman (In re Zeman), 60 Bankr. 764 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1986) (fact that involuntary transfer forced transferor to cease business established
that property was necessary to business, and that its transfer left the transferor with
unreasonably small capital).
'W7See, e.g., Winchester v. Charter, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 606 (1866); Todd v. Nelson,
109 N.Y. (64 Sickels) 316, 16 N.E. 360 (1888). See also Kepler v. Atkinson (In re Atkinson),
63 Bankr. 266, 269 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1986) (mother's guaranty of son's debt was not
a business or transaction contemplating business).
"8811 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982); UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i); UFCA, supra
note 1, § 5.
18"Holcomb v. Nunes, 132 Cal. App. 2d 776, 283 P.2d 301 (1955). See Kepler v.
Atkinson (In re Atkinson), 63 Bankr. 266, 269 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1986), in which the
court held that a mother's guaranty of her son's debts was not a "transaction" of the
type contemplated in the UFCA, and stating that the section "appear[s] to be principally
directed to those situations in which a party is about to engage in a business venture
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it limits the population of potential plaintiffs to those who become
creditors "during the continuance of such . . . transaction."' 90 The UFTA
carries on this concept with its requirement that the "remaining assets
of the debtor [be] unreasonably small in relation to the . . . transac-
tion."' 9 1 Both of these sections limit the type of transactions which may
qualify; both require a showing of a need for capital or assets for the
continuance of the transaction. This limitation also leads to the second
requirement: that non-payment was a reasonably foreseeable effect of
the lack of adequate resources.
2. The Second Requirement: A Reasonably Foreseeable Connec-
tion.-The second requirement can most easily be seen as an analogue
to section 4 of the UFCA dealing with transfers by insolvents. The
objective of section 4 was creditor protection by requiring the transferor
to retain sufficient assets to meet all debts. 192 Yet, as the early cases
showed, many debtors took advantage of vagaries surrounding asset
valuation and difficulties regarding the proof of intent, and left themselves
solvent, but just barely so.' 9
Section 5 of the UFCA was an attempt to close these gaps. It
imposes an additional burden on transferors; they must not leave them-
selves with unreasonably small-or inadequate' 94-capital or reserves.
This protects present creditors from valuation squabbles and future
creditors from the debtor who would gamble on their extension of
credit.' 9 It is important to note, however, that the statute does not
make the transferor the insurer of adequacy; it only condemns as fraud-
ulent those transfers which leave the transferor with "unreasonably small
capital."
' UFCA, supra note 1, § 5 (emphasis supplied); see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii).
"'UFTA, supra note 1, § 4(a)(2)(i) (emphasis supplied).
'See supra text accompanying notes 53 to 82.
'9'See supra text accompanying notes 44 to 52; M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, § 3, at
230-33.
,"The Reporter's Notes to the UFTA indicate that "unreasonably small" and "in-
adequate" are essentially interchangeable. Reporter's Notes to § 4 of the UFTA, 7A
U.L.A. 654 (1985) ("The subparagraph focuses attention on whether the amount of all
assets retained by the debtor was inadequate, i.e., unreasonably small, in light of the
needs of the business or transaction in which the debtor was engaged or about to engage").
'"The classes protected against this gamble are broad. They include taxing agencies
as well as regulatory authorities. United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co., 565 F. Supp.
556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (indication that factor in finding unreasonably small capital under
Pennsylvania law was that transferor failed to provide adequately for union health care
contributions and for environmental "backfilling" obligations to Pennsylvania), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied
sub nor. McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987); United States v.
Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595, 617 F. Supp. 595, 617 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (United
States and state environmental agencies have standing to attack fraudulent conveyances under
Tennessee version of UFCA); United States v. 58th Street Plaza Theatre Inc., 287 F. Supp.
475 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (taxing authority).
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But what is an "unreasonable" amount? As noted in many cases,
the exact amount varies with the particular case. 196 This does not translate,
however, into a toothless, relative, standard. Rather, the existing cases
can be distilled into the following: capital remaining after a transfer is
unreasonably small when the unpaid creditor/plaintiff can show its non-
payment was a reasonably foreseeable effect 97 of the transferor's failure
to retain, or failure to provide for, an adequate amount of resources
from and after the transfer to satisfy the unpaid plaintiff/creditor's
claim. '9
An essential element of this formulation is the presence of a con-
nection between the disputed transfer and non-payment of the creditor's
claim. This requirement is historical; section 5 was distilled from cases
which allowed creditors to attack a transfer only if they could somehow
connect their non-payment with some universally agreed inference that
the transferor, at a relevant time, knowingly left itself with too little
reserves. 199
',"Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978),
aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980); Zuk v. Hale, 114 N.H. 813, 330 A.2d 448
(1974); 1 G. GLENN, supra note 1, § 335.
19 1f the claim was subject to a bona fide dispute, the showing would entail proof
that the claim was genuine, and that non-payment, after the normal course of dispute
resolution, was the result of inadequate capital. Cf. II U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1982) (only claims
not subject to bona fide dispute may be counted in meeting jurisdictional minimum amount
for involuntary bankruptcy). In addition, holders of subsequent claims related to expenses
which are necessary, such as utilities and trade suppliers, will fare better than holders of
subsequent non-essential expenses, in that holders of such "non-essential" claims will have
a more difficult time showing a connection between the transfer and their non-payment.
'"See Comment, supra note 5, at 1509 (assuming transfers that leave transferors with
few unencumbered assets must be "causally linked" to inability to pay debts in order to
create fraudulent transfer liability). See also cases cited infra note 199; Kepler v. Atkinson
(In re Atkinson), 63 Bankr. 266, 269 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1986) (Capital retained must
be measured "relative to the nature of the venture.").
This test may be applied differently depending upon whether the plaintiff is an
individual creditor, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession. In the case of the
private party plaintiff, the date of non-payment will set the relevant period for the review
of the adequacy of capital. See supra note 183. With respect to trustees and debtors in
possession, the plaintiff is a representative of all creditors, either under the strong arm
powers of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) or under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). As such, the trustee or debtor
in possession would be able to use an extended period of relevancy, bounded at one end
by the date of the transfer and at the other end by the date fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations. In addition, a trustee or debtor in possession would have a relaxed
version of causation; the hierarchy of necessity would no longer be relevant given the
broad representation of the trustee. See supra note 197. See also Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S.
4 (1931).
" In Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 229 (1823) for example, the Supreme
Court considered the connection between the transfer and the loss claimed by the creditor.
In Sexton, there had been a two year delay between the challenged transfer and the
creation of the creditor's debt. In finding that this period of time was sufficient to cleanse
19881
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This type of requirement, although not articulated as such, has
played a vital role in many section 5 cases finding fraudulent transfers.
In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National Bank,200 for example, a de-
pression-era bank president engaged in stock speculation to support
artificially the price of the bank's stock. Even though the president was
found to be solvent after the transfer in question-by at least $80,0002°1-
the court looked to the nature of the speculation and found that "[tihe
precarious chance of successful issue of business conducted with such
slender margin must be considered,"2 °2 and that the scale of business
rendered the remaining capital inadequate. 23 In short, the wide swings
inherent in such trade required large reserves; by deliberately reducing
the reserves by the transfers-which went to premium payments on the
life insurance policies that were the subject of the lawsuit-it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that his resultant insufficiency of capital would result
in unpaid creditors. 2°4
Similarly, in McBride v. Bertsch,20 5 a fruit juice manufacturer and
seller conveyed all his personal property, worth $30,000, in trust for his
the transfer, the Court noted that at the time of the transfer, Wheaton, the transferor,
"had no view to trade. Although his failure was not very remote from the date of the
deed, yet the debts and the deed can in no manner be connected with each other; they
are as distinct as if they had been a century apart." Id. at 250. See also Kearny Plumbing
Supply Co. v. Gland, 105 N.J. Eq. 723, 149 A. 530 (1930) (refusing, under New Jersey
version of section 5, to draw "unfavorable inference" as to unreasonably small capital
when non-payment occured two years after transfer); Mackay v. Douglas, 14 L.R.-Eq.
106, 122, 26 L.T.R. (n.s.) 721, 723 (Ch. 1872) ("If a person enters into no contract
which would result in insolvency, and was not contemplating anything which might have
that result, such a settlement would be perfectly good .. "); M. BIGELOW, supra note
27, § 3, at 231 ("There must be a connection between the gift and the subsequent credit.").
More recently, in In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 346 (N.D. Ill.
1964), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub
nor. Limperis v. A.J. Armstrong Co., Inc., 386 U.S. 957 (1967), the court found evidence
of unreasonably small capital from a demonstrated inability to pay debts as they matured
after the transfer, and from numerous bank overdrafts. See also New York Credit Men's
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Adler, 2 Bankr. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
100313 Pa. 467, 169 A. 209 (1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 680 (1934).
1Id. at 476, 169 A. at 212-13.
211d. at 482, 169 A. at 215.
M3Id. at 476, 169 A. at 213.
That different amount of reserves would be required by different transferors was
a point noted early and widely. M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, § 3, at 233, 237; 0. BUMP,
supra note 31, § 257, at 297. See also Bakst v. Presley (In re E.D. Presley Corp., Ltd.),
44 Bankr. 781, 783 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (operation of Canadian securities firm requires
substantial liquid assets). Indeed, in the early case of Hunters v. Waite, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.)
25 (1846), the transferor was characterized as "a man of sanguine temperament, and ex-
tremely imprudent habits." Id. As such, the Court scrutinized carefully his transfer, and
found it lacking for failure to consider his "imprudent habits" in providing for the future.
Id. at 47.
"'McBride v. Bertsch, 58 F.2d 797 (W.D. Mich. 1930), aff'd, 58 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.
1932).
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family. At the time of the transfer, he had $11,000 in debts.2°6 Although
"substantially" all of these debts were paid when the transferor went
bankrupt three year later, 20 7 the court found that the seller had "prac-
tically no capital," but an intent "to continue in the business and to
incur large indebtedness in and about its expansion and operation.
20 8
These expansion plans highlighted the inadequacy of the remaining cap-
ital. A business may exist on the cash and income it generates; it is
reasonably foreseeable, however, that expansion financed concurrently
from income may require some reserves. Without such reserves, the court
invalidated the transfer. 2°9
McBride left unanswered a crucial question-whether the transfer
would have withstood scrutiny if no expansion was contemplated. Recent
cases have addressed this problem by concentrating on a business' ability
to generate sufficient cash from operations, or to issue debt or equity
securities for cash.
One such case was Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Building
Supplies, Inc. 210 There, the sole shareholder of a corporation caused the
corporation to borrow funds on a secured basis.211 He later removed
these funds from the corporation to pay a personal loan to the same
bank.212 Although the corporation had equity of over $57,000 after the
transaction, 2 3 the court noted that, prior to the transaction, the cor-
poration had only been marginally profitable. The incurrence of the
secured loan thus not only reduced the pool of unsecured assets, it
imposed a further drain on the corporation's cash flow through the
introduction of new and additional debt service. Accordingly, its only
hope was to expand sales-with the hope of expanding profits and
additional cash-but the debt service on the secured loan effectively
prevented it from successfully undertaking this expansion. 2 4 With this
connection between the reasonably anticipated effect of the transfer and
61d. at 797.
2O71d.
m'Jd. at 798.
2OJd.
110475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980). In
Sweney v. Carroll, 118 N.J. Eq. 208, 178 A. 539 (1935), decided under section 5 of the
UFCA, the resources of an individual who was building a house were at issue. The
plaintiffs were unsatisfied trade creditors. In deciding whether a previous transfer had left
the individual with sufficient funds, the court took into account that "[tihere was no
intent or expectation of building the house on credit." Id. at 215, 178 A. at 543. Since
the court found that this intent was not unreasonable, it upheld the transfer. Id.
2I1475 F. Supp. 693, 695 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980).
2121d.
2UId.
2
"Id. at 697.
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the non-payment thus established, the court found the transfer invalid. 215
A more detailed analysis of cash flow was at issue in Credit Managers
Association of Southern California v. Federal Co. 216 There, General
Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) had financed a management-lead
leveraged buyout, in which management purchased their company, Cres-
cent Foods, from The Federal Company. As in Desert View, management
caused their new company, Cresent, to pledge its assets as security for
both the loan from GECC and the deferred portion of the purchase
price to Federal. Unlike Desert View, however the court found that the
extensive cash flow projections prepared to convince GECC to make its
loan reasonably showed that Cresent would have "sufficient expected
cash flow to stay in business." 21 7 Under the circumstances, the court
found the remaining capital to be adequate. 21
Other cases have also looked to cash flow, albeit in more oblique
manners. Some cases have looked to "working capital," which is some-
times defined as the difference between liquid or short term assets and
short term liabilities. Thus, in Zuk v. Hale,2 9 a special equity master
found the transferor had $5,000 in "working capital" at the time of
the transfer.220 Although there was evidence that the transferor's business
of being a general contractor generally required $7,000 to $13,000 in
such "working capital," ' 22' the transferor's retention of a lower figure
was supported on testimony that it would be sufficient in that case if
receivables were timely paid.2 2 2 In other words, the amount of the
contractor's expected cash receipts was adequate to cover his expected
debts.
A different result was reached in Steph v. Branch.223 In Steph a
shareholder sold the stock in his business to another, who in turn secured
the deferred portion of the purchase price with the assets of the business .24
The business also agreed to pay this deferred portion over time. 225 Again,
there was a finding of solvency at the time of the transfer, 226 but there
was testimony from accountants that the range of "reasonable" capital
2151d.
116629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
2'7 1d. at 184.
2
'1d. at 187-88.
219114 N.H. 813, 330 A.2d 448 (1974).
2 O1d. at 816, 330 A.2d at 450.
22
1Id. at 816, 330 A.2d at 451.
222
td.
22255 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Okla. 1966), aff'd, 389 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968).
22Id. at 528.
2251d.
261Id. at 529 (court found that insolvency occurred some three months after the
transfer).
[Vol. 21:469
FRA UDULENT TRANSFERS
was from $10,000 to $50,000.227 From this testimony, the court had no
trouble finding that working capital of $5,000 was inadequate. 228
In each of these cases the nature of each business and its individual
operating needs set the range of reasonable capital. 229 If, as in Steph,
the remaining capital was not in this range, the capital was unreasonably
small. 230 Cases such as Credit Managers and Zuk, however, show that
not all failed businesses with meager capital qualify as businesses with
"unreasonably small" capital. 2 1 From this analysis, it can be seen that
non-payment for reasons other than inadequate resources may not qualify
under section 5 and its progeny. For example, under this analysis a
transferor could defeat an unreasonably small capital action if it could
show that it had adequate reserves but did not pay the debt due to a
bona fide dispute over whether the debt was due. 2 2 In short, the proof
required seems to be that, all other things being equal and the debt
being valid, non-payment was the reasonably foreseeable effect of in-
adequate operating reserves, not other commercial defenses to payment. 23
As a result, if the transferor can show a course of trade justifying the
amount of reserves retained, or can produce reasonable cash flow pro-
"271d. at 532.
"'Similarly, in In re Atlas Foundry Co., 155 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 1957), the court
made an explicit finding that although the questioned transfer left the transferor solvent,
it left the transferor with "cash capital" of only $25,000, which was insufficient to meet
its standard requirement of $200,000 to $300,000 in such cash capital. See also Kearny
Plumbing Supply Co. v. Gland, 8 N.J. Misc. 789, 151 A. 873 (1930) (transfer made in
a month in which net worth dropped from $3868 to a negative $941.19 was made at a
time when transferor had unreasonably small capital).
1191n re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 346 (N.D. 111. 1964), rev'd on
jurisdictional grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Limperis v.
A.J. Armstrong Co., Inc., 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (court found evidence of unreasonably
small capital from a demonstrated inability to pay debts as they matured after the transfer,
and from numerous bank overdrafts); accord New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau,
Inc. v. Adler, 2 Bankr. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union
Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 169 A. 209 (1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680
(1934) (court found transferor solvent, but not sufficiently so to carry on stock speculation
business).
23OSee also United States v. 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (court found that capital was inadequate if tax liability were to be assessed at full
amount claimed; left unanswered whether transferor was bound to consider full amount
of liability or only discounted value after probability of success was taken into account).
""'But the law does not require that companies be sufficiently well capitalized to
withstand any and all setbacks to their business. The requirement is only that they not
be left with 'unreasonably small capital' at the time of the conveyance alleged as fraudulent."
Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 187 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
212See supra text accompanying notes 197-98.
"Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1982) (order for relief on involuntary petition not allowed
when debts not being generally paid are subject to a bona fide dispute).
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jections from the time of the transfer, covering the time period in which
the plaintiff's claim arose, 23 4 it will have shown that, although it had
small capital, the amount was not unreasonably SO.2
35
3. The Final Requirement: A Direct and Causal Link Between the
Transfer and Non-Payment.-The last prerequisite to finding inadequate
capital is that the transfer must directly lead to non-payment. Initially
excluded by this test are cases where there is an alternate and cheaper
manner in which to conduct the business; in short, the transferor's
profligacy may be used as a supervening cause. 236 A case in point is
Jacobson v. First State Bank (In re Jacobson).37 In that case, the court
found that alternate ways of conducting the business after the transfer-
by renting the land and equipment transferred-would have been cheaper,
and presumably would have avoided creditors' non-payment. 238 Accord-
ingly, it found the remaining capital was adequate. 23 9
This additional requirement is also necessary because subsequent
events may make it inequitable to prefer a creditor over a transferee.
Take, for example, the occurrence of an unforeseen and unforeseeable
calamity after a transfer. If this calamity would have accounted for
non-payment even if adequate reserves had been retained, the presence
of this intervening and supervening cause should bar fraudulent transfer
liability. Likewise, if a transferor leaves itself with unreasonably small
capital, but later builds up capital or assets to a reasonable level,
23 For differences in treatment between private party plaintiffs and plaintiffs whose
standing derives from the Code, see supra text accompanying note 198.
235The outside limit within which the parties to the transaction are at risk is limited
by the applicable statute of limitations. See supra note 198. The UFTA suggests a four
year limitation period for transfers involving unreasonably small assets, UFTA, supra note
1, § 9; the Code limits the period to one year prior to the date the bankruptcy petition
was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982). The rule under the UFCA is not uniform; some
states have statutes of limitations as long as six years, McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F.
Supp. 232, 237-38 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in relevant part, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970),
and at least one case has suggested that no statute of limitations under the UFCA may
apply against the United States as sovereign. United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co.,
Inc., 565 F. Supp. 556, 583 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor
Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986). This may prove to be a boon to
bankruptcy trustees, see 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982) (bankruptcy trustee has standing of
any creditor as of the date the petition was filed).
2 6See Hunters v. Waite, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 26 (1846) (imprudent habits of transferor
considered when evaluating transfer).
11748 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
23 id. at 501.
2391t did this by finding that the property transferred was not "necessary to the
continued operation of Plaintiff's business." Id. Cf. Tarbox v. Zeman (In re Zeman),
60 Bankr. 764, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (involuntary transfer which forced transferor
to cease business established that property was necessary to business, and that its transfer
left the transferor with unreasonably small capital).
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subsequent creditors should have no ability to challenge the original
transfer. 240
The case law has recognized this common sense notion. Early cases
recognized that "losses in trade, or by fire, or by storms" cut off
liability to future creditors. 241 More recent cases have added to this list.
For example, in Jenney v. Vining,242 a husband and wife had transferred
ownership of their house from joint ownership to sole ownership by the
wife. 243 Later, one of the husband's business associates challenged this
transfer in order to levy execution on the house.244 The husband had
not paid the judgment leading to the levy because, four months after
the transfer, he and his business had entered into a new venture, and
that venture had failed. 245
After finding that the transfer left the husband solvent, 246 the equity
master found that the new venture was not in contemplation at the time
of the conveyance, and was the cause of the demise of the husband's
business. 247 In short, although the master, by implication, found that
non-payment was reasonably foreseeable given the low level of capital
left by the transfer, he also found the new venture was not reasonably
foreseeable. This subsequent event was thus held to override the level
of capital remaining after the transfer.
Similarly, in Credit Managers Association of Southern California v.
Federal Co.,24a a management led leveraged buyout failed. An attack
was mounted along unreasonably small capital lines. Although the court
found that capital was adequate on the basis of cash flows developed
at the time of the cash flows, 249 it also inquired into intervening events.
In particular, the transferee pointed to two unforeseen events: the loss
of a major customer,2 0 and a four month labor strike by the Teamsters'
union. 2 1 Both of these events adversely affected an admittedly marginal
operation; indeed, the court characterized the strike as a "crippling blow
from which [the transferor] never fully recovered. ' 5 2 As a consequence,
21The historical antecedent for this proposition is set forth in M. BIGELOW, supra
note 27, § 3, at 227 n.1; D. MOORE, supra note 47, § 10, at 283.
210. BUMP, supra note 31, § 262, at 300-01. See also M. BIGELOW, supra note 27,
§ 3, at 229.
242120 N.H. 377, 415 A.2d 681 (1980).
"I3 d. at 378, 415 A.2d at 682.
2.1d.
2451d.
'Id.
2
"Id. at 379, 415 A.2d at 683.
2'629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985).241Id at 187. See also supra text accompanying notes 144 to 146.
2
"'Id. at 184.
25 1d.
121d. at 186.
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the court did not allow the ultimate failure of the business to lead, in
an "almost tautological manner ' 253 to a finding of unreasonably small
capital. Rather it viewed these events to be in the nature of supervening
causes, excusing or exonerating the transferor. This holding recognizes
that businesses fail for all sorts of reasons, and that fraudulent transfer
laws are not a panacea for all such failures. 25 4
C. Burdens of Proof
Once a transfer has been isolated for the above analysis, practical
questions arise: who has the burden of producing evidence on the points
set forth above, and who has the burden of persuading the trier of fact
of the truth of each point? Under the UFCA, the plaintiff would have
each of these burdens. 25 If applied directly to the above analysis, this
would require the plaintiff to present evidence and to prove the truth
of each of the following: lack of fair consideration or reasonably equiv-
alent value; that the transferor was in business or about to be engaged
in business; that non-payment was reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the transfer due to the transferor's lack of adequate present and
future resources; and that, but for the transfer, the plaintiff's claim
would have been paid.
A well-recognized exception, however, permits the court to infer a
proscribed financial state once the plaintiff has shown a lack of fair
consideration or reasonably equivalent value.25 6 The burden then shifts
to the transferor, or, more likely, the transferee, 257 to show that the
transferor's financial state permitted such a cheap transfer. The under-
lying premise of this exception derives from the typical state court setting:
2
'See Alces & Dorr, supra note 168 at 560.
214See M. BIGELOW, supra note 27, § 3, at 227 n.1.
'See, e.g., Bodino v. Barondess (In re Good Time Charley's, Inc.), 54 Bankr. 157,
162 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) (applying New Jersey law, the court dismissed case because,
after showing a lack of fair consideration, trustee "failed to present evidence to establish"
unreasonably small capital); T W M Homes Inc. v. Atherwood Realty & Inv. Co., 214
Cal. App. 2d 826, 29 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1963) (California version of section 4 of the UFCA);
Holcomb v. Nunes, 132 Cal. App. 2d. 776, 283 P.2d 301 (1955) (California version of
section 5 of the UFCA).
2'6Kingdom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 269 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1959) (applying New
Mexico law); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 499 (N.D.
Cal. 1980) (applying California law); Neumeyer v. Crown Funding Corp., 56 Cal. App.
3d 178, 187-89, 128 Cal. Rptr. 366, 371-73 (1976) (citing similar cases from New York,
Pennsylvania and Maryland).
"'In most cases, the transferee will be the primary target, since resort to fraudulent
transfer law by its nature presupposes that the transferor/debtor is unable to satisfy its
obligations to the creditor/plaintiff. See, e.g., Neumeyer v. Crown Funding Corp., 56
Cal. App. 3d 178, 187-89, 128 Cal. Rptr. 366, 371-73 (1976).
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two creditors battling over whether one should be able to retain the
benefits of a cheap transfer. Since the transferor is typically not present,2 5 8
or without incentive to defend, 25 9 the shift makes sense; it forces the
recipient of a cheap transfer to justify its retention.
This shift applies, however, only to cases in which the UFCA or
the UFTA provide the governing law; it does not apply to cases brought
under section 548 of the Code since the assumptions supporting the shift
do not apply. 260 The debtor in possession or the trustee2 6' is most likely
to possess financial information regarding the transferor, and, presumably
is in the best position to recreate the transferor's financial state. More-
over, these entities are directly attacking their predecessor's bargain, and
thus may be in a better position to control or color the proof regarding
it.
This division of proof and the equitable allocation of labor it entails
is sound, and should be carried through to the analysis set forth above.
A transferor or its favored transferee should be able to better establish
whether the transferor was engaged in business. With respect to adequacy
of resources and causation, liberal discovery should enable plaintiffs to
at least establish a prima facie case. 262 In addition when the burden
2
1
81n Neumeyer, for example, the transferor had long since disappeared and could
not be compelled to attend the trial. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 182, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 368.2
'
9See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
z6Corbin v. Franklin Nat'l Bank (In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Securities Litigation),
2 Bankr. 687, 710 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem., 630 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980) (under
Act); Jacobson v. First State Bank of Benson (In re Jacobson), 48 Bankr. 497, 501 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1985) (burden of proof on debtor ir possession as plaintiff); In re Tabala, 11
Bankr. 405, 408 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 79,
548.10, at 548-123 to 548-124. Compare Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Federal
Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 183 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (assignee for benefit of creditors empowered
to use presumption under state decisional law) with Kupetz v. Continental I1l. Nat'l Bank
and Trust Co. of Chicago, 77 Bankr. 754, 762 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (bankruptcy trustee did
not show he met state law conditions for presumption), aff'd sub. nom. Kupetz v. Wolf,
845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
26 In some jurisdictions, entities other than the debtor in possession or trustee may
bring a fraudulent transfer action. Hansen v. Finn (In re Curry and Sorensen, Inc.), 57
Bankr. 824, 828-29 & n.3 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); see generally Karasik, Standing to Initiate
Adversary Proceedings in a Bankruptcy Case, 92 CoM. L.J. 83 (1987). Because the standing
of these parties appears to be derivative to the trustee or the debtor in possession, the
burden shift should not apply. Currey and Sorensen, Inc., 57 Bankr. at 828. See Kupetz
v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 77 Bankr. 754, 762 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (finding insufficient factual basis to justify state law burden shift), aff'd sub. nom.
Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
"In In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., the court found evidence of unreasonably small
capital from a demonstrated inability to pay debts as they matured after the transfer,
and from numerous bank overdrafts. 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. 111. 1964), rev'd on juris-
dictional grounds, 369 F.2d. 513 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Limperis v. A.J.
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shift discussed above is available,2 63 a plaintiff will also be able to state
and make its case by simply showing that the transfer was for less
than reasonably equivalent value. This burden shift is also supported
by the fact that, under cases such as Credit Managers, a transferor or
transferee can provide a complete defense by producing reasonable and
realistic cash flow projections from the vantage point of the transfer.2 64
V. CONCLUSION
Although the unreasonably small capital section of the fraudulent
transfer laws has not drawn great attention, it has developed a significant
body of case law. As shown above, a general theme for future application
of the section can be distilled from these precedents. An action will lie
under the unreasonably small capital section if a transfer is made for
less than reasonably equivalent value, and if: the transferor is engaged
in business or a business transaction; non-payment of the plaintiff's
claim was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the transfer due to the
inadequacy of the transferor's reasonably foreseeable present and future
resources; and but for the transfer and the inadequacy of the transferor's
resources, the plaintiff's claim would have been paid.
This analysis views the unreasonably small capital section in its
historical context; that is, as an auxiliary and adjunct to the section of
the fraudulent conveyance law on transfers by insolvents. It also is a
tool to distinguish and discredit at least two unwarranted per se rules
that have developed in the unreasonably small capital jurisprudence.
Given the renewed interest in fraudulent transfers generally, and the
likely increased resort to the unreasonably small capital section specif-
ically, the analysis developed in this article can be used to restore part
of fraudulent transfer law to its original place. Consistency and "true
and plain dealing" could then be restored to an area of the law not
necessarily known for those virtues.
Armstrong Co., Inc., 386 U.S. 957 (1967). See also New York Credit Men's Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. Adler, 2 Bankr. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).26 3See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
21Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 184 (C.D.
Cal. 1985).
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